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Abstract 
We investigate theoretically and empirically the role of wholesalers in mediating the productivity effects 
of trade liberalization. Intermediaries provide indirect access to foreign produced inputs. The 
productivity effects of input tariff cuts on firms that do not directly import therefore depends on the 
extent that wholesalers are a feature of input supply within an industry. Using firm level data from 
China, we document that wholesalers play no such role for direct importers. However, other firms 
experience productivity gains from reducing input tariffs if trade intermediation of foreign inputs within 
their sector is high. They suffer efficiency losses otherwise. 
JEL: F12, F13 
Keywords: Firm heterogeneity, Trade liberalization, Intermediate inputs, Productivity, Intermediaries, 
China.  
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1. Introduction 
The international economics literature provides clear evidence that the productivity of firms improves 
as a direct consequence of trade liberalization.1 Several explanations have been put forward to explain 
these productivity increases.2 Initially these focused on the effect of output tariffs increasing competition 
within the industry, in a process labelled ‘trimming the fat’ (Pavcnik, 2002).  More recently the focus 
has been on the role of inputs. Here it is argued that the ability to import intermediate inputs generates 
productivity gains for firms through learning, variety and quality effects. Amiti and Konings (2007) 
were the first to investigate this and report using Indonesian data that the productivity gains from input 
tariff reductions were around twice as large as those from output tariff changes of the same size. 
Supportive evidence can be found in Kasahara & Rodrigue (2008) for Chile, Halpern, Koren and Szeidl 
(2015) for Hungary, Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) for India, and Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015) for 
France. 
Of interest to this paper, Amiti and Konings (2007) also report positive productivity effects from cuts to 
input tariffs for what are normally labelled as non-importing firms, although they are strongest for those 
that directly importing intermediate inputs. In this paper, we investigate whether this ‘domestic firm 
puzzle’3 is explained by the presence of input trade intermediaries. More commonly known as 
wholesalers, such service sector firms provide indirect access to foreign produced inputs. Our empirical 
evidence shows that when the intermediation of inputs through wholesalers is a strong feature of input 
supply within an industry, there are productivity gains for firms not directly importing. In their absence, 
there are productivity declines. The investigation of these productivity outcomes due to the presence of 
wholesalers represents the main contribution of the paper to the broader literature. 
The economic literature has long recognized the role that wholesalers and retailers play in linking 
producers with their consumers. Intermediaries have been argued to exist in order to reduce search costs 
by offering their market expertise or guaranteeing the quality of goods (Rubinstein and Wolinksy, 1987; 
Yavas, 1994; Biglaiser, 1993; Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994). Their importance in cross-border trade 
has been revealed only in more recent years. According to Jones (1998), trading companies account for 
over 40% of exports and over 70% of imports in Japan, while Blum et al. (2009) document that 41% of 
imports occur through intermediaries in Chile. Using detailed information from trade transaction data, 
Bernard et al. (2010) estimate that wholesale and retail firms account for 10% of exports and 24% of 
imports in US.  In our data for China, wholesalers account on average for 21.4% of total imports of 
intermediate inputs across manufacturing sectors. Theoretical developments in this trade literature 
include Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011), Akerman (2010), Antràs and Costinot (2010, 2011), Blum, 
                                                          
1 Melitz and Redding (2014) argue that productivity effects are an important component of the ‘gains from trade’. 
2 Additional effects on aggregate productivity may occur due to the exit of low productivity firms (Pavcnik, 2002; 
Bernard et al. 2006), or the reallocation of market shares towards more productive survivors (Pavcnik, 2002).  
3 We credit one of the referees for this paper for naming this puzzle. 
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Claro, and Horstmann (2009), Crozet, Lalanne and Poncet (2013) Rauch (1999, 2001), Felbermayr and 
Jung (2011), Petropoulou (2008) and Rauch and Watson (2004). A general finding from this literature 
is that trade intermediaries provide access to international markets for those firms that would otherwise 
find the costs of exporting directly prohibitive. A corollary to this outcome for exports, would be that 
for some domestic firms, wholesalers represent a source of foreign produced intermediate inputs they 
would not otherwise have.  
To empirically evaluate the productivity effects of wholesalers for firms not directly importing during a 
period of input tariff liberalization we construct a novel industry level measure using Chinese custom 
data, balance sheet data and input-outputs tables. To separate direct-importers from those that do not 
directly import we use the customs data matched to balance sheet data. To construct our industry-specific 
measure of inputs imported by wholesalers, we begin by identifying for each sector the fraction of import 
transactions by wholesalers and trade intermediaries.4 Using input-output tables we can then proportion 
the share of these inputs sold on to other sectors of the economy. 5 Using data for the period 2002-2006, 
which corresponds to the period soon after China’s entry to World Trade Organization (on 11th 
December 2001), we generate a number of findings. We first show we can replicate the findings from 
Amiti and Konings (2007) and others, that the revenue-based productivity of direct-importers along with 
those not directly importing improves as a consequence of input tariff liberalization, and that the benefits 
to direct importers are greater. To highlight the role played by trade intermediaries we explore how the 
effect of input tariff cuts differ for firms according to the extent of wholesaling of imported inputs in 
their industry. The analysis reveals that the productivity of firms not directly importing increases when 
input tariffs fall, only if wholesalers are an important source of input supply in the industry. When 
wholesalers are unimportant, our results suggest productivity declines for such firms.  
A possible explanation for these results draws from well know reallocation effect as in Melitz (2003), 
induced by the trade liberalization in the intermediate input sector. As tariffs decrease, direct importers 
as well as firms importing through wholesalers are able to import new input varieties from more efficient 
suppliers and, potentially, at a higher quality, which ultimately could increase their productivity. At the 
same time, non-importing firms may face a decrease in the domestic inputs supplied to them due to the 
increase of competition in the input supplier sector, leading to a decrease in their productivity. In this 
case, the effect of input trade liberalization on the productivity of non-direct importers captured by the 
empirical literature (e.g. Amiti and Konings, 2007) will be a composition of the effects on from firms 
reliant solely on domestic suppliers and those importing through wholesalers. Ultimately the overall 
effect will depend on the importance of wholesalers within an industry. 
                                                          
4 As in other international trade data, we are unable to observe the purchases by domestic firms from wholesalers. 
This explains our use of an industry level of wholesaling. 
5 The balance sheet data also allow us to construct a measure of revenue productivity. Our data do not allow us to 
measure physical TFP. We make the connection between the predictions and revenue TFP in the next section of 
the paper. 
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This role for service sector firms to mediate the effects of trade liberalization can be seen to complement 
other potential explanations, in particular those that come from other manufacturing firms along the 
supply chain. Fieler et al. (2018) develop a quantitative framework using the ideas of spillovers to 
generate such outcomes. In their model, firms upgrade quality following the decision to import or export. 
This leads to an increase in the demand for high-quality inputs at home, implying skill upgrading for 
labor and quality upgrading for materials inputs. These positive demand effects are amplified through 
domestic supply chains, including for those not directly involved in trade, who are also induced to 
upgrade quality. Using Colombian firm-level data Eslava et al. (2015) are also able to show empirically 
that importing intermediate inputs allows firms to upgrade their technology. They document positive 
spillover effects, not only for importers, but also for non-importers (or non-traders) they supply inputs 
to. An alternative mechanism is offered by Tintelnot et al. (2018), who show that non-importing firms 
may benefit from their links to trading firms. Using firm-to-firm sales for Belgium they show firms can 
be directly impacted by international trade through imports, as well as indirectly through the inputs that 
may have been imported by their domestic suppliers. They use this data to estimate models of production 
networks and international trade including allowing for endogenous network formation. They find 
within such a model that this amplifies the gains to trade from a positive trade shock.  
The presence of spillovers discussed in Eslava, et al. (2015), or the endogenous supplier networks in 
Tintelnot et al. (2018), would ensure that firms both directly and indirectly involved in international 
trade benefit from imported inputs by other manufacturing firms. In this paper we do not rule out the 
presence of these additional mechanisms, although our finding of a negative effect for non-direct 
importing firms when wholesaling is low, would not easily been explained by these alternative forces 
alone. The identification assumption that underpins our findings is that these other benefits from trade 
liberalization for firms not directly importing are uncorrelated with links to the service sector that we 
explore using the measure of industry wholesaling. To provide support for this assumption, we 
undertake a wide array of robustness tests including falsification tests and tests for treatment 
heterogeneity.  Initial support for this assumption can be drawn from the fact that the presence of 
wholesalers does not matter for those firms directly importing. We find that firms directly importing 
benefit from trade liberalization, as would occur within the Eslava, et al. (2015) and Tintelnot et al. 
(2018) models, but there is no heterogeneity across these firms associated with the extent of wholesaling. 
Wholesalers boosts revenue-based productivity during the period of trade liberalization only for those 
firms not directly importing.  
As an additional falsification test we also show that wholesalers play no role if firms import under 
processing trade rules, where imports are not subject to tariffs and wholesaling effects are absent. We 
further extend the analysis to use ownership as a means of capturing those firms for which wholesaling 
is likely to be a more important feature of input supply. We find from these tests for treatment 
heterogeneity that wholesalers deliver important productivity impacts for domestically owned firms, 
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whereas for foreign owned firms, who are likely to have access to foreign produced inputs through other 
channels or have preferential access, they play no role.  
A small literature has also shown that increased globalization amongst service sector firms can affect 
the productivity performance of firms in the manufacturing sector. For instance, Arnold et al. (2011) 
and Arnold et al. (2016) document that service sector reforms increased firm performance within 
downstream manufacturing sectors using those services as inputs in the Czech Republic and India, 
respectively. Our work differs in that it is the intermediate inputs that serve to raise firm productivity, 
rather than the service acting as the source of that change. This paper therefore highlights an additional 
source of productivity gains from trade liberalization through trade intermediation services. We also 
consider this possible alternative role for wholesalers within the analysis, firstly by removing exporters 
and then later by constructing an additional measure of wholesaling for exports and for output goods. 
The results are suggestive of an effect from wholesalers for both output goods and exports, but the main 
results for imported inputs remain intact. 
As a final section on robustness we also attempt to control for these additional mechanisms in a more 
direct manner by including additional control variables in the regression. We are able to show that our 
main findings for non-direct importers are robust to the addition of alternative sources of productivity 
gains, allowing the effects of trade liberalization to differ for these firms according to the degree of 
import competition, the quality of inputs or their position within the supply chain (upstreamness). They 
are also robust to the use of an instrumental variable approach to deal with endogeneity concerns about 
input tariff cuts. Taken together, these results strongly suggest that wholesalers guard against 
productivity losses from trade liberalization for firms that do not directly import. 
In developing this set of findings, we recognise a number of studies that have previously investigated 
the effects of trade liberalization on Chinese firms.  A number of these report productivity effects from 
input tariff changes and differences across firms or industries. For example, Bas and Strauss-Kahn 
(2015) show that following an input tariff reduction, firms importing under ordinary trade rules 
increased both their import and export prices compared to pure processing importers (which by 
definition are not subject to input tariffs). They conclude from this that input tariff liberalization led to 
quality upgrading of imported inputs, which in turn, implied quality upgrading of exported outputs. 
Brandt, et al. (2017), Hu and Liu (2014) and Yu (2015) consider the effect of input tariff liberalization 
across all Chinese manufacturing firms and find positive effects of similar magnitude to ours. Yu (2015) 
also documents that the productivity gains are weaker for firms importing using processing 
arrangements. Finally, Yu et al. (2013) show that the increase in import penetration led to productivity 
improvements for firms producing differentiated goods, while the efficiency of firms producing 
homogenous goods was negatively affected. The role played by trade intermediation has so far been 
omitted from this literature.  
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The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the theoretical motivation, along 
with its connection with the data that we have available. A fuller version of the model is available in 
Appendix 1. In Section 3 we discuss the data and construction of the main variables of interest, along 
with the empirical strategy. The main results of the paper are presented in Section 4, while in Section 5 
we draw some final conclusions from the analysis. 
 
2. Theoretical Motivation 
This section offers some theoretical background behind the intuitions for our empirical analysis, and 
notably, discusses how trade liberalization in intermediate inputs affects the revenue-based productivity 
of firms who import directly, versus those firms not directly importing. We include a more formal 
version within Appendix 1. 
Set-up 
Final good producers j face the same iso-elastic demand function: 
 𝑦𝑗 = 𝐶(𝑝𝑗 )
−𝜎
,     (1) 
where 𝜎 > 1  is the elasticity of demand, 𝑝𝑗  is the price set by the final good producer and 𝐶 is a 
constant term from the point of view of the firm. 
Final good producers have an exogenous Hicks-neutral productivity 𝛩𝑗 and integrate together a set of 
intermediate inputs 𝑥𝑖 into final goods, that in turn are sold to consumers, as in Ethier (1982). 
 𝑦𝑗
𝑚 = 𝛩𝑗𝑋
𝑚      with         𝑋𝑚 = (∫(𝑥𝑖
𝐻)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿∫(𝑥𝑖
𝐹_𝑚)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑖)
𝜎
𝜎−1
(2) 
where 𝜎 > 1 is also the elasticity of substitution between intermediate input varieties 𝑖. The superscript 
m=M, I, D indicates the import-mode of final good producers: direct-importer (M), indirect-importer 
(I)6 and non-importer (D).7 The subscript 𝐻 indicates inputs produced at Home, while 𝐹 indicates inputs 
produced in the foreign country. 
We model wholesalers as a vehicle through which foreign input varieties can be purchased by indirect-
importers. 𝛿 is a firm specific dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the final good producer is 
either a direct or an indirect importer (m=M, I) and the value 0 if the final good producer is not importing 
any inputs (m=D).  
                                                          
6 These are defined as firms that import inputs using wholesalers. 
7 These are defined as firms that rely solely on domestic input producers. 
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Given the iso-elastic demand function faced by final producers 𝑗, they will set a price as a constant mark-
up over their marginal cost, which depends on both their Hicks-neutral productivity 𝛩𝑗 and the price 
index of their intermediate inputs 𝑃𝑚, which will take the following form: 
𝑝𝑗
𝑚 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
𝑃𝑚
𝛩𝑗
     with                  𝑃𝑚 = (∫(𝑝𝑖
𝐻)
1−𝜎
𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿 ∫(𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝑚)
1−𝜎
𝑑𝑖)
1
1−𝜎
(3) 
Final good producers that are direct- or indirect-importers (M and I firms) will be able to consume both 
domestic and foreign varieties, while non-importers (D firms) will only be able to use domestically 
produced inputs. 
Revenue-based TFP 
Empirically, we wish to estimate the impact of input trade liberalization on firms’ productivity. A well-
known difficulty is that we usually do not observe in the data the quantity of output produced or the 
quantity of inputs bought by firms. Instead, we use the total revenue of firms and their expenditure on 
intermediate inputs.  
First, let us consider the total revenue of the firm 𝑟𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗𝑦𝑗. By considering the inverse demand function 
from (1), the total revenue can be written as: 
𝑟𝑗 = (𝑦𝑗 )
𝜎−1
𝜎 (𝐶)
1
𝜎 (4) 
Second, let us rewrite the production function using the expenditure in intermediate inputs 𝐸𝑚 =
𝑃𝑚𝑋𝑚 instead of the quantities: 
𝑦𝑗
𝑚 = 𝛩𝑗𝑋
𝑚 = [𝛩𝑗
1
𝑃𝑚
]𝑃𝑚𝑋𝑚 = [𝛩𝑗
1
𝑃𝑚
] 𝐸𝑚   for     𝑚 = 𝐷, 𝐼,𝑀. (5) 
Using (4) and (5) the production function in terms of revenues and input spending can be expressed as: 
𝑟𝑗
𝑚 = (𝛩𝑗
1
𝑃𝑚
)
𝜎−1
𝜎
(𝐸𝑚)
𝜎−1
𝜎 (𝐶)
1
𝜎 (6) 
where the firm-level revenue-based Total Factor Productivity (TFP), depends both on the firm-level 
Hicks-neutral productivity 𝛩𝑗 and the firm-level price index of their intermediate inputs 𝑃
𝑚. By taking 
the logs and considering that changes in input tariffs over time 𝑡 occur through the input price index, we 
can highlight the production function to be estimated: 
ln 𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑚 =
𝜎 − 1
𝜎
ln𝛩𝑗 + 
1 − 𝜎
𝜎
ln𝑃𝑡
𝑚 +
𝜎 − 1
𝜎
ln𝐸𝑗𝑡 + ln 𝐶𝑡 (7) 
Thus, the revenue-based TFP of final good producers is positively related to the exogenous productivity 
𝛩𝑗, and negatively related to the endogenous price index of intermediate input varieties consumed 𝑃𝑡
𝑚. 
 8 
 
The firm-level Hicks-neutral productivity 𝛩𝑗 which we expect to be constant over time will be captured 
by firm-fixed effects while the aggregate component 𝐶𝑡 , common across firms will be captured by year 
dummies. Hence, the change in TFP following a change in input tariff occurs through a change in 𝑃𝑚.  
 
Trade liberalization in intermediate inputs, reallocation and productivity change 
How is the TFP of final-good producers affected by trade liberalization in intermediate inputs? As 
discussed above, it will be affected directly if it impacts the price index of intermediate inputs bought 
by firms. Trade liberalization in the input sector will increase import competition and lead some 
domestic suppliers to exit the market. As a result, the decrease in the number of domestic varieties will 
increase the input price index for affected firms. At the same time, as tariffs decrease, foreign suppliers 
will start to supply domestic firms able to import with new input varieties at a cheaper price and, 
potentially, a higher quality. This effect will ultimately decrease the input price index for such firms.  
Crucially, depending on their import mode (non-importers, direct or indirect importers), firms may be 
affected differently by these various changes in the availability of inputs. Non-importers (D firms) will 
only be able to consume domestically produced input varieties. As trade costs decrease in the input 
sector, their intermediate input price index will rise, and accordingly their revenue-based TFP will fall. 
Direct and indirect importers (M and I firms) will be able to access foreign input varieties. Input trade 
liberalization could therefore decrease the input price index for these firms, and ultimately increase their 
revenue-based TFP. As a result, importing firms may experience an improvement in their productivity 
following input trade liberalization consistent with the empirical evidence by Amiti and Konings (2007). 
A basic reallocation effect of this type in the intermediate input sector can be formalized using a similar 
framework to that developed by Melitz (2003). In Appendix 1, we provide a theoretical illustration, 
where the intermediate input sector is characterised by monopolistic competition and where 
heterogeneous input suppliers draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution. There are two main 
differences between the Melitz (2003) model and such a framework. First, input suppliers sell their 
inputs to final good firms and not directly to consumers. However, given the CES structure of the 
intermediate input composite, input suppliers will also face an iso-elastic demand function. Second, and 
more importantly, foreign suppliers will only be able to sell their varieties to the domestic final-good 
producers that are importing, either directly or through wholesalers. Assuming heterogeneous final good 
producers with endogenous import decisions, this difference generates the prediction that a reduction in 
trade costs implies that more suppliers start exporting for the foreign country but also that some final 
good producers in the home country start importing, entailing an increase in the demand for imported 
inputs. 
As expected, input trade liberalization leads to reallocation effect similar to the one described in Melitz 
(2003). The more productive suppliers expand their sales abroad, while all suppliers face increasing 
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import competition such that the least productive suppliers exit the market. Final good producers able 
to buy intermediate inputs from abroad (directly or indirectly) benefit from new foreign input varieties, 
even when facing a decline in the number of local varieties available to them. Due to the input 
reallocation effect, non-importers face an increase in their input price index, which ultimately decreases 
their revenue TFP. 
 
Empirical implications  
Within the data that are available to us we observe two group of firms: direct importers (M firms) and 
the firms that are not direct importers. The group of non-direct importers will be composed of both the 
non-importers and the indirect-importers (and so labelled I+D firms). While all those firms will be able 
to consume domestic input varieties, only a fraction of final-good producers will be able to use additional 
foreign input varieties sourced through wholesalers.  
As a result, the effect of input trade liberalization is expected to be different depending on the prevalence 
of firms importing through wholesalers among the group of firms that are not directly importing (I + D 
firms). In an industry where the input wholesaling cost is high, input trade liberalization is expected to 
decrease TFP. In contrast, within industries where the cost of trade intermediation using wholesalers is 
lower, the negative productivity effects associated with a loss of domestically produced inputs will be 
mitigated by the positive revenue TFP effects for those firms able to import through intermediaries. As 
a result, the relative benefit of input trade liberalization on the TFP of non-direct importers (I + D firms) 
will be larger in an industry where the share of firms importing indirectly is higher relative to the share 
of firms not importing at all. The interaction between the measure of input trade liberalization and the 
prevalence of firms importing through wholesalers will be central in our empirical investigation. 
A difficulty when evaluating the impact of input trade liberalization on the group of firms not importing 
directly in a given sector (I + D firms) is that we do not observe the share of firms importing indirectly 
in the data. To address this point empirically, we use the input-specific Wholesaler Share at the industry 
level (WS), i.e. the value of inputs imported via wholesalers in total imported inputs within an industry. 
In our illustrative theoretical framework, in Appendix 1, we show that WS is a function of the costs 
associated with imports intermediated by wholesalers. More specifically, WS is inversely related to the 
wholesaling cost within a sector, and as a result, the variation in WS affects the prevalence of indirect 
importers within the group of firms not importing directly in a given sector (I + D firms). This theoretical 
result is the key for the interpretation of our empirical results. Input trade liberalization is expected to 
decrease TFP in industries with high input wholesaling costs, that is where WS is low. This productivity 
loss will be mitigated in industries where WS is high. In addition, in our framework, WS appears to be 
unaffected by trade liberalization in the intermediate input sector. This provides us with a theoretical 
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foundation for considering WS as a time-invariant sector-specific characteristic in our empirical 
specification.8 
Finally, we note that the presence of spillover effects arising from input trade liberalization may affect 
our empirical results, where a decrease in input tariffs could lead to an increase in productivity of both 
direct and non-direct importers. In Appendix 1, we briefly describe the effects of introducing a positive 
spillover effect associated with input trade liberalization in our framework. As a first point we note that 
such spillovers would increase the TFP of all firms that use domestically sourced inputs. Cross-industry 
heterogeneity may still be present of course, if the extent of these spillovers varies across industries. 
Therefore, to empirically identify the effect of wholesalers, it is required that these spillovers are 
uncorrelated with the prevalence of wholesalers in an industry. In other words, any spillover effects may 
affect the average TFP change (in a hypothetical industry with an average level of WS), but not the 
comparison of the effect of tariff changes across industries, and across firms within the industry, due to 
wholesaling. 
 
3. Data, variable construction and estimating equation 
Our analysis relies on firm-level balance sheet data from the Chinese Manufacturing Annual Survey and 
firm-level international trade activities from the Chinese Custom data. The Chinese Annual Survey of 
Industrial Firms (CASIF), carried out by the National Bureau of Statistics in China, is an unbalanced 
panel of close to 480,000 firm-year observations over the period 2000-2006 and includes all state-owned 
firms and private firms whose annual sales are above 5 million RMB (i.e. about 700 thousand USD). 
For each firm-year observation the dataset records information on output, sales, fixed assets, 
intermediate inputs,9 number of employees, ownership status, location and industry (National Standard 
Classification). 10  
The Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), managed by the General Administration of Customs of 
China, records all international trade transactions over the period 2000-2006. Each transaction includes 
the name of the firm, its address, as well as the product code of the imported or exported product at the 
8-digit level following the Harmonized System (HS) classification, its fob value, quantity and unit value, 
origin and destination country as well as the custom regimes under which it was traded, e.g. ordinary 
trade regime, processing trade regime etc. 
                                                          
8 A further advantage of holding the level of WS constant in our empirical setting is that it allows us to disentangle 
the input tariff effect from any changes in WS. We consider the robustness to this point in Section 4. 
9 Observations with negative values for intermediate inputs and total fixed assets variables are removed from the 
sample. 
10 During our period of analysis, two different editions of the four-digit Chinese Industrial Classification are used: 
GB/T4754-1994 and GB/T4754-2002. Brandt et al. (2017) construct a concordance table, which we use to provide 
a time-consistent measure of industry for each firm. 
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Our empirical analysis relies on a matched version of the balance sheet data from the annual survey and 
the custom data. We use the CASIF data to compute our firm-level productivity measure and the CCTS 
to identify direct-importers and to construct our industry level measure of indirect imports. In the 
absence of unique identifiers for each firm, the merging of the two datasets is based on an algorithm that 
matches firm names and contact information.11 Upward, et al. (2013) discuss issues surrounding the 
reliability of these matches, although they note that this information is less likely to be missing or to 
change over time. We note that the two datasets do not completely intersect as the CASIF data includes 
large manufacturing firms only, whereas the custom data records all trade transactions from both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors without any size threshold. We are able to match about 
50% of the firms reporting exports in the annual survey with the custom data. The customs data allows 
us to identify firms that are directly involved in international trade, i.e. direct importers and direct 
exporters. Firms with no direct import transactions are defined as I+D firms.  
A further advantage of the customs data is that it allows us to observe the customs regime under which 
imports are made. This is important for our definition of direct importers. Transactions undertaken under 
different customs regimes are subject to different tariff levels. The most frequent regimes are ordinary 
trade and processing trade (associated with either assembly or imported materials). Together these 
represent 84% of total imports in our sample period. Given our interest in the effects of trade 
liberalization and the fact that transactions completed under processing trade rules are duty free, we 
focus our empirical analysis on firms that import all goods under ordinary trade rules. To be clear, we 
remove from our definition of direct importing firms, any firm using processing trade in any of their 
import transactions. We retain these observations for use as a placebo test on the role of trade 
intermediaries in mediating the effects of input tariff changes (see regression 3 in Table 4).  Finally, we 
restrict the sample to a balanced panel of firms that do not change their direct importer status or their 
main sector activity during our sample period in order to remove any effect that trade liberalization may 
have on direct-importer status, the main sector of activity of a firm or the probability of survival in an 
industry.  
 
Estimating equation 
Before detailing the construction of our main variables of interest we briefly introduce the empirical 
model to be estimated, which takes the following form:  
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0𝜏𝑘𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛽1(𝐼 + 𝐷)𝑗𝜏𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑆𝑘 (𝐼 + 𝐷)𝑗𝜏𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑗𝜏𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑆𝑘 𝑀𝑗𝜏𝑘𝑡 
+𝛽5𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
                                                          
11 See Upward, et al. (2013) for more details about the matching procedure.  
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where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡   is the revenue productivity of firm j measured in time t. The variable 𝑀𝑗 is a dummy 
variable that takes value one if firm j directly imports, and zero otherwise, whereas  (𝐼 + 𝐷)𝑗 is a dummy 
variable that takes value one if firm j does not directly import (i.e. it is an indirect importer or does not 
rely on foreign inputs).12 𝑊𝑆𝑘 is our measure of wholesaling of imported inputs used by sector k,  while  
𝜏𝑘𝑡 is the input tariff and 𝜏𝑘𝑡
𝑦
 
is the output tariff for sector k in time t.  
We note two main points about this regression model and the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. 
Firstly, the interpretation of the estimated coefficient  will depend upon the extent of wholesaling 
within the industry. To aid with its interpretation we centre the value of 𝑊𝑆𝑘 on the mean value of 
wholesaling. In this case, 𝛽1 now captures the effect of input tariff changes on I+D firms in an industry 
with the average level of wholesalers, while 𝛽2 captures what happens to TFP as wholesaling moves 
above or below this mean. As a related point, in the presence of spillovers or indirect linkages leading 
to positive productivity effects associated with trade liberalization to non-direct importers, the 
coefficient  would increase in absolute magnitude. However, as long as the size of these spillovers or 
linkages effects are uncorrelated with the importance of wholesalers within an industry, it would not 
affect the coefficient 𝛽2. We anticipate that 𝛽2 < 0. A decrease in input tariffs would then imply an 
increase in productivity for non-direct importers (I+D firms) in sectors with a high wholesaler intensity 
𝑊𝑆𝒌 .   
Second, the role of wholesalers is identified from variation across sectors and from variation across 
firms (I+D versus M). In contrast to the expected significance of the interaction with wholesaling for 
non-direct importers, we anticipate that for direct importers 𝛽4 will not be statistically significant. From 
the existing literature we would anticipate that 𝛽3 < 0. That is, we expect that for direct importers, their 
productivity will increase as a consequence of input tariff declines regardless of any wholesaling of 
foreign inputs in their industry.  
Finally, 𝐶𝑗𝑡 represents a set of firm-level control variables, namely, a dummy variable taking value one 
if the firm exports, a dummy variable assuming value one if firm is state-owned, and another one equal 
to one if the firm is owned by foreign investors, including those from Hong-Kong, Macao or Taiwan. 
𝜃𝑗 and 𝜃𝑡 denote firm fixed effects and common time dummies respectively and 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is a classical error 
term, where the errors have been corrected for clustering at the firm level. We include firm fixed effects 
to control for any time-invariant firm-specific determinants of the productivity and time dummies to 
control for any common shocks that occur during this time period. The firm fixed effects along with the 
use of a balanced panel of firms that do not switch direct import or non-direct import status explains the 
                                                          
12 As explained above, by construction firms are uniquely defined as either direct importers, M firms, or non-direct 
importers, I+D firms, in the sample. 
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absence of the variables M and I+D within the estimating regression (other than their interaction with 
the input tariff and wholesaling variables). 
 
TFP 
We construct our measure of revenue TFP for each firm by first estimating the following log-linearized 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑙𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡  
where 𝛾𝑙, 𝛾𝑘 and 𝛾𝑛 stand for the factor shares of production and 𝑦𝑗𝑡, 𝑙𝑗𝑡, 𝑘𝑗𝑡 and 𝑛𝑗𝑡 denote respectively 
the natural logs of output, labor, capital and intermediate inputs of a firm 𝑗 at time 𝑡. Output is measured 
by the nominal value of sales deflated by factory price index at 2-digit industry level, labor is proxied 
by the number of employees, capital is measured by total fixed assets, deflated by a province-specific 
fixed asset investment price index, and intermediate inputs are measured by total expenditures on 
intermediate goods deflated by the weighted-average price index for intermediates at 2-digit industry 
level.13  
Following Amiti & Konings (2007), the production function is estimated separately for each 2-digit CIC 
sector using a modified version of Olley and Pakes (1996). Specifically, we correct the estimates of TFP 
for simultaneity between productivity shock and firm’s decision to import and to export – by considering 
that firms have to pay sunk fixed costs if they want to be involved in international trade – in addition to 
the problem of simultaneity between input choices and productivity shocks,14 and the problem of sample 
selection.15  By assuming the error term 𝑢𝑗𝑡 is composed of two components, a white noise component 
𝜂𝑖𝑡 and a time-varying productivity shock 𝜀𝑗𝑡, 𝑢𝑗𝑡 = 𝜂𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡, Olley & Pakes (1996) showed that the 
investment demand 𝐼𝑗𝑡 depends on two state variables, capital 𝑘𝑗𝑡 and productivity 𝜔𝑗𝑡, i.e. 𝐼𝑗𝑡 =
𝑖(𝑘𝑗𝑡 , 𝜀𝑗𝑡). They also demonstrated, under certain conditions, this investment function is monotonically 
increasing in productivity, so that the latter variable can be expressed as function of capital and 
investment, i.e. 𝜀𝑗𝑡 = 𝑖(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝐼𝑗𝑡). Moreover, assuming that firm’s decision to trade takes place as the same 
time as its decision to invest, Amiti & Konings (2007) included two additional state variables, import 
status 𝑀𝑗𝑡 and exports status 𝑋𝑗𝑡, so that the productivity can be written as the following function: 𝜀𝑗𝑡 =
𝑖(𝑘𝑗𝑡 , 𝐼𝑗𝑡,𝑀𝑗𝑡 , 𝑋𝑗𝑡  ). By substituting the latter equation into the production function above – 𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾0 +
𝛾𝑘𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝐼𝑗𝑡 ,𝑀𝑗𝑡 , 𝑋𝑗𝑡  ) + 𝜂𝑗𝑡 – consistent estimates of input coefficients can be computed 
                                                          
13 De Loecker (2011) argues that using this information to proxy the output, the coefficients of production function 
can still suffer problems of omitted price variable bias. Unfortunately, we do not have the data required to cover 
this kind of problem (i.e. product-firm level data). 
14 The correlation between productivity shocks and inputs choice makes OLS estimates of production function 
inconsistent. 
15 Firms can exit the market if productivity falls below a certain threshold, and consequently OLS estimates can 
be inconsistent. Given that we allow for the productivity shocks arising from surviving firms only. 
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through using nonparametric techniques. In the first step, consistent estimates of 𝛾𝑙 and 𝛾𝑛 can be 
obtained. In the second step, the probability of the firm exiting is then estimated, and in the final step, 
coefficients for state variables are estimated. Once input coefficients are estimated, we can define the 
natural log of measured revenue 𝑇𝐹𝑃
 
of firm j at time t as 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒋𝒕 = 𝑦𝑗𝑡 − 𝛾𝑙𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑡  
The Olley-Pakes coefficients of the production function are displayed in Table 1 together with OLS 
coefficients for a comparison. Table 2 provides summary statistics on the sample used to estimate 
productivity. In our sample of manufacturing firms for the year 2002, 13.7% of firms are directly 
involved in importing. The TFP of these direct importers is higher on average than firms that do not 
directly import. This holds irrespective of whether firm TFP is measured using Olley-Pakes or a 
production function estimated using OLS. In 2006, share of direct importers increased to 15.0%, but the 
productivity advantage of these firms relative to firms that do not directly import remained.  
 
 
Share of Wholesalers in Imported Inputs (WS)  
Our industry-level measure capturing the importance of wholesaling in importing intermediate inputs is 
constructed using a combination of the Chinese customs data (CCTS) and Chinese input-output tables. 
We begin by identifying wholesalers, retailers and other trade agents within the Chinese Custom data 
following Upward et al. (2013) and Ahn, et al. (2011). To do so we search firm names for a set of 
keywords specifically linked to intermediary activity. We use this to measure the value of 8-digit HS 
products that are imported by wholesalers and trade intermediaries into China. As an example, 7.3 
percent of the 2002 Chinese ordinary imports for the product HS-85016100 (Electric Motors with an 
output not exceeding 75KVA) were realized by firms, whose names implied that they were involved in 
intermediary activities. In the same year, 49.8 percent of the Chinese ordinary imports of the product 
HS-85016200 (Electric Motors with an output exceeding 75KVA but not exceeding 375 KVA) would 
be classified as imported through wholesalers under our definition. The 8-digit HS codes of the customs 
data are matched to the 4-digit CIC industry codes using the concordance table provided by Upward et 
al. (2013), which in turn are matched to 3-digit IO industry codes of the input-output table using the 
concordance table constructed by Brandt et al. (2017). 
Retaining only ordinary trade transactions from the Custom data, we then calculate for the first year of 
our sample (2002) the share of total imports within an industry through wholesalers at the 3-digit IO 
industry level. We label this industry-level variable 𝑊𝑆𝑘
𝑦
, the share of final goods imported by 
wholesalers. 
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Our measure of the share of intermediate inputs imported by wholesalers within a sector, 𝑊𝑆𝑘 , is 
constructed using these wholesale shares, 𝑊𝑆𝑘
𝑦
 , and proportioning them to different sectors using as 
weights the industry input shares from the 2002 Chinese Input-Output (IO) table. 
𝑊𝑆𝑘 =∑𝑎𝑘′𝑘.𝑊𝑆𝑘′
𝑦 =
𝑘′
∑𝑎𝑘′𝑘.
imports through wholesalers 𝑘′
total imports 𝑘′
𝑘′
 
where the terms 𝑎𝑘′𝑘 refer to input weights of industry k’ in the production of a good in industry k. In 
this way we capture the indirect imports of inputs into an industry that come through wholesalers. It is 
worth noting that we calculate the weights 𝑎𝑘′𝑘 using the input cost of industry k’ used in the production 
of a good in industry k divided by the total intermediate inputs consumed by the industry k. A similar 
approach to the construction of import weights is taken by Amiti and Konings (2007).  The final 
wholesaling variable is available at the 3-digit IO industry level.  As noted above, in line with our 
theoretical motivation above we fix the measure of import wholesaling over time. We have constructed 
a time-varying version of import wholesaling, although in general there is relatively little cross-time 
variation. We report results using this time varying measure of wholesaling in Table 5 column 7. 
Summary statistics on our measure of indirect importing at the 2-digit industry level are displayed in 
Table 3. For reference we also report in the table the share of final goods that are imported through 
wholesalers. The table shows quite clearly that wholesaling of final good imports display different 
patterns to the wholesaling of imported intermediate inputs. For example, the share of wholesalers in 
total imports for the food sector (𝑊𝑆𝑘
𝑦
) is 0.5, while the share of intermediate inputs that are imported 
through wholesalers (𝑊𝑆𝑘 ) is 0.094. That is, 50.0% of all foreign food products consumed in China 
have been imported by wholesalers, while 9.4% of foreign intermediate inputs used for Chinese food 
production have been imported through wholesalers. There is also considerable variation in the extent 
of input wholesaling across sectors. For example, sectors such as Petroleum/coking (4.2%) and Food 
(9.4%) rely more heavily on direct importing, whereas Chemical fibre (32.1%) and Clothing (31.2%) 
source a greater share of imported inputs from wholesalers.   
 
Input and Output Tariffs 
In the last decade, China’s international trade policy has been altered by its entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2001. Through the WTO accession protocol, China bound 100% of 
its tariffs at ad valorem rates, and started to charge the MFN duty rate to all WTO members. In addition, 
it made several commitments to reduce all tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. Our measure of trade 
liberalization are constructed using tariff data from the WITS database at the 8-digit HS level16 which 
                                                          
16 1997 tariff data refer to HS-1996 classification, whereas tariff data over 2002-2006 period refer to HS-2002 
classification. This problem is solved through a concordance table. 
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provides information about MFN current bound duty rates, MFN applied duty rates and General duty 
rates. From these we construct both output and input tariff variables using the same methodology found 
in Amiti and Konings (2007). Output tariffs 𝜏𝑘𝑡
𝑦
 are measured at the 4-digit CIC level as the simple 
average of 8-digit HS level tariffs (using ad valorem MFN applied duties).  Input tariffs 𝜏𝑘𝑡 are then 
measured at the 3-digit IO industry level and calculated as a weighted average of output tariffs, weighted 
by the importance of that input in production, where these weights are taken from the Chinese Input-
Output table: 
𝜏𝑘𝑡
𝑚 =∑𝑎𝑘′𝑘. 𝜏𝑘′𝑡
𝑦
𝑘
 
The tariff rates for intermediate inputs in 2002 and 2006 are provided in Table 3. A comparison of the 
tables shows that average input tariff was 6.8% in 2002 and 5.3% in 2006.  
 
4. Results 
In Table 4 we report the effect of changes to input and output tariffs on revenue productivity. In column 
1, we replicate the baseline regressions found in Amiti and Konings (2007), albeit where we use data on 
Chinese rather than their data on Indonesian firms. Consistent with that study we find evidence that 
trade liberalization significantly affects revenue productivity, even when controlling for firm fixed 
effects. Higher output tariffs and input tariffs have the expected negative effect on productivity, where 
the latter are statistically significant for firms that either directly import their inputs (M firms) as well 
as for those who do not (I+D firms). The effect of reductions in input tariffs on productivity in column 
1 are strongest for those firms that are direct importers. According to the results, a one percentage point 
decline in input tariffs increases the revenue productivity of direct importers by 3.65 per cent and for 
firms that do not directly import by 0.93 per cent. These findings are consistent with a number of 
interpretations that include trade liberalization allowing importers to access intermediate inputs 
produced abroad through wholesalers or through indirect effects on domestic input producers. These 
results also support the previous literature on Chinese importers found in Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015). 
For intermediate inputs Brandt, et al. (2017) and Hu and Liu (2014) and Yu (2015) report similar sized 
coefficients for direct importers and for other firms to those found here.17  
Having demonstrated we can replicate results from the previous literature we next move to the main 
empirical contribution of our paper and allow the effects of input tariffs to differ according to the share 
wholesaling of foreign intermediate inputs. The results from this regression are reported in column 2. 
                                                          
17 Input tariffs are always estimated to have strongly negative effects on productivity, with benchmark estimates 
in Brandt et al (2017) implying that a 1% input tariff cut increases Chinese manufacturing firms productivity 
between 1.79% and 1.62%. In their baseline results, Hu and Liu (2014) report an estimate of 1.56% while Yu 
(2015) report an elasticity of 1.47%. 
 17 
 
As noted already, to ease the interpretation of the interaction terms in this regression we centre the 
wholesaling variable by subtracting its mean value. Using this approach, the estimated coefficient on 
the input tariff variable in column 2 provides the estimated productivity effect for firms in an industry 
with the average level of wholesaling. The interaction term then indicates how productivity is affected 
as the wholesaling of inputs moves away from this mean. 
We begin by noting that the results for the wholesaling of intermediate inputs differs for firms not 
directly importing (I+D) firms compared to direct importers (M). We find evidence that wholesaling of 
imported inputs matters for the productivity response to input tariff cuts only for firms that do not 
directly import (I+D firms).18 As expected, for firms that directly import there is no evidence that 
wholesalers have a statically significant role in moderating the productivity gains that result from the 
liberalization of input tariffs. According to the results in column 2, direct importers benefit from input 
tariff liberalization, regardless of the presence of input wholesalers. Heterogeneity in the effects of 
wholesalers across direct importers and firms not directly importing forms part of the identification 
strategy that we use.   
As discussed in section 2, the positive revenue productivity effects from input tariff reductions for non-
direct importers are increasing in the importance of wholesalers as a source of foreign inputs. When the 
wholesaling share is relatively low, firms may suffer productivity losses if previously domestically 
produced inputs are lost. Our results are consistent with an interpretation that not all firms benefit from 
trade liberalization if wholesalers are not present. As implied by the interaction terms, the productivity 
effects from reductions in input tariffs for those firms that are not direct importers passes from negative 
to positive depending on the wholesaling share. As the wholesaling variable is centred on its mean value, 
the estimated coefficient on the input-tariff variable provides information as the effect of input tariffs 
for firm in industries with average levels of wholesaling (of 22.4%). Our results suggest that firms in 
this average industry, along with others in industries with below average levels of wholesaling, there are 
productivity declines because of input tariff liberalization.  
The value of wholesaling for which the effect of input tariffs cuts on productivity passes from negative 
to positive is 0.26 (26%).19 According to Table 3, there are fourteen out of twenty-six 2-digit sectors 
where the value of wholesaling is below this critical value, including food & beverages, metals & non-
metallic minerals, and raw chemicals & medicines. For the mean value of wholesaling and the mean 
change in input tariffs (-1.5 percentage points), our results estimate imply a revenue TFP decline of 
about 1%. For an industry where intermediaries are of greater importance, such as Clothing, which has 
an indirect importing of inputs share of 0.312, the productivity gains from trade liberalization are 1.42 
                                                          
18 These results are robust to the inclusion of firms that import some, but not all, inputs using ordinary trade rules. 
19 Looking at column 2 in Table 5, we use the coefficients associated with input tariff and input tariff interacted 
with WS, and notice that 0.661-18.28*WS=0 for WS=0.036. As the wholesaler variable is centred on its mean 
value, which is 0.224, we obtain the value of WS for which the effect is zero as 0.224+0.036=0.26. 
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%. We also note that the results in this column could imply that indirect importers would benefit more 
from trade liberalization than direct importers if WS was higher than 0.45 (45%). However, as the 
highest value for WS is 0.321, such an industry does not exist in the data. At the maximum observed 
value of wholesaling in the data, the productivity benefit implied by our results would be 1.167, which 
is about three times lower than the effect found for direct importers. 
To further strengthen the conclusion that wholesaling matters for the productivity effects of trade 
liberalization, we consider further placebo tests.  For the results generated in columns 1 and 2 we include 
in the sample only those firms that used imported inputs that are subject to tariffs (they are imported 
under ordinary trade rules). That is, we excluded firms which used any inputs imported under processing 
trade rules, which would be tariff-free. As a placebo test in column 3 we add to the regression firms that 
only import inputs under processing trade rules. Given the absence of tariffs on the imported inputs of 
processing firms, we would expect that trade liberalization and its interaction with wholesaling should 
have no effect on their productivity over this time period.  Significance of the estimated coefficients for 
these processing firms would therefore serve to undermine our conclusions. Fortunately, we find instead 
there are no statistically significant effects from input tariff cuts on the productivity of processing firms, 
and in addition that wholesalers play no role as an indirect source of inputs for these firms. In contrast, 
we continue to find that firms that do not directly import benefit from the presence of wholesalers, while 
firms that directly import under ordinary trade rules enjoy productivity gains from input trade 
liberalization, but there is no effect from wholesalers for such firms. 
In the remainder of Table 4 we undertake further tests of the robustness for the main set of findings. We 
begin by considering the possible sensitivity of our results to the measure of revenue TFP. For this task 
we use a measure based on a production function estimated by OLS as it imposes fewer assumptions 
compared to the Olley-Pakes measure. The results appear very similar to the regression in column 2. 
Thus far, we have included the export status of the firm as a control variable. It remains possible that 
firms that both export and import may respond differently to input tariff reductions compared to firms 
that import only (directly or indirectly) or do neither. In support of this view, Fieler, et al. (2018) consider 
the productivity effects that arise from export expansion and returns to scale and their interconnection 
with imports. Alternatively, exporters might further benefit from wholesalers if these provide 
intermediate services for such firms (Arnold et al., 2011; Arnold et al., 2016).20 By excluding exporters 
from our sample in column 5, we are able to identify the effect of inputs tariff cuts on direct importers 
and those not directly involved in import activities, while abstracting from the scale effects generated 
by trade liberalization or those through the use of services as an intermediate input. Again, we find that 
the main results are robust to the exclusion of these firms.  
                                                          
20 We return to this point below. 
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As further means of establishing the credibility for our interpretation of the results, in column 6 we 
explore alternative forms of cross-firm heterogeneity in the effects of wholesalers for non-direct 
importers. In this regression we allow the effects of input tariffs to differ according to whether non-
direct importers are privately owned, state owned or foreign owned. Here we anticipate that the 
beneficial effects of trade liberalization of input tariffs are likely to be strongest for those firms that were 
previously most constrained in their access to foreign produced inputs. In the context of China, these 
constrained firms are most likely to be privately owned Chinese firms and state owned enterprises. The 
plants owned by foreign firms are likely to have access to foreign produced inputs through other 
preferential channels.  
We find strong evidence of different productivity responses to input tariff cuts across these different 
types of firms. Amongst firms that did not directly import, we find that the interaction between changes 
to input tariffs and the extent of wholesaling is statistically significant for private and state-owned. There 
is no significant effect found for foreign-owned firms. For privately owned firms, the effect of input 
tariffs changes on productivity becomes positive once wholesaling reaches 27.2%. This is slightly higher 
than in the baseline model in column 2 (26%). For state owned firms the threshold is at a level of 
wholesaling equal to 24.0%. The effects of wholesaling are therefore strongest for those firms that are 
most likely to benefit from their presence during periods of trade liberalization. Again, while this finding 
that wholesaling matters more for those firms most constrained in their access to higher quality inputs 
does not completely rule out the possibility that there may be alternative explanations for our results, it 
makes it less likely. 
 
Directly Controlling for Alternative Mechanisms 
In Table 5, we consider a more direct approach to the question of alternative explanations for our 
findings by adding additional controls for industry characteristics. The construction of these industry 
control variables 𝐼𝐶𝑘  , have a similar structure to that used to generate the wholesaling of imported 
inputs variable and takes the common general form: 
𝐼𝐶𝑘 =∑𝑎𝑘′𝑘. 𝐼𝐶𝑘′
𝑦
𝑘′
 
In this equation IC is the weighted average of the output-specific industry characteristic 𝐼𝐶𝑘′
𝑦  in the 
upstream sector, where weights 𝑎𝑘′𝑘 are from the Chinese IO table and variables are measured at the 3-
digit IO industry level. 
We begin by exploring the robustness of our main findings to whether the estimated coefficient on the 
wholesaling interaction variable in fact captures some aspect of import competition between firms in 
the input sector, or alternatively this import variable is correlated with spillovers in Fieler et al. (2017). 
The hypothesis here would be that domestic firms operating in industries in which the share of 
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importing, including indirect imports through wholesalers, is high, are subject to stronger forces of 
competition. This greater competition may encourage firms to strive to become more efficient, the 
effects of which are then passed along the supply chain to downstream firms. In support of the idea that 
competition has an important effect on productivity during periods of trade liberalization, Pavcnik 
(2002) finds results consistent with such an interpretation using a measure of output-tariffs.  An 
alternative explanation found in Fieler et al. (2017) would be that import competition is correlated with 
the increased incentive to invest in input quality generating spillovers to firms not directly importing. 
To construct this variable, we begin by measuring import competition at the sectoral level as a ratio of 
the weighted average of imports over sales minus exports in upstream sectors, i.e. by setting  𝐼𝐶𝑘
𝑦 =
 
imports𝑘
(sales−exports)𝑘
. We then calculate this for the input sector using the equation set out above. As 
highlighted by Amiti and Konings (2007) this variable may also capture the indirect effect of imported 
inputs embodied in domestically produced inputs.  The results in column 1 of Table 5 suggest that 
changes in import competition in the input sector have no statistically significant effect on the 
productivity of those firms that they supply. There is also no difference in the effect of import 
competition in the upstream sector according to whether the firm directly imports or not. The effects of 
trade liberalization through wholesalers are, in contrast, significant despite the addition of these new 
controls. 
In column 2, we address a concern that the use of wholesalers for the purchase of intermediate inputs 
within an industry may be positively correlated with how close the firm is to the end of the production 
process. Here we might anticipate that industries closer to the consumer are offered greater opportunities 
for spillovers or input upgrading (Tintelnot et al., 2018) through the supply chain and therefore should 
benefit more from trade liberalization.  Labelled upstreamness, to construct this measure we first 
compute an output-specific industry upstreamness measure (𝐼𝐶𝑘
𝑦
 in the above equation) following the 
methodology outlined in Antras, et al. (2012). We then convert this to the input level using weights from 
the input-output table.  
It would appear that this issue of how close the firm is to the end of the production process has no 
bearing on the benefits from trade liberalization. Moreover, how close the firm is to the final consumer 
does not modify the productivity effects of input tariff reductions previously found for either direct 
importers or those that do not directly import. The wholesaling of intermediate inputs remains a 
significant determinant of revenue productivity during periods of trade liberalization only for firms not 
directly importing.  
Next, in column 3 we explore a more direct measure of the quality of inputs that are produced abroad. 
This effect of trade liberalization is outlined in Fieler, et al. (2018).  We follow Khandelwal, Schott and 
Wei (2013) and measure product quality using quantity and average unit values at the 6-digit product-
origin pair, together with the elasticity of substitution between products computed by Broda, et al. (2006) 
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for China. We then construct the 𝐼𝐶𝑘′
𝑦
 measure as the average quality of 6-digit product/origin pairs 
within the industry k’, before converting it into an input measure for each sector.  
The results presented in column 3 indicate that this works to lower the productivity of firms that do not 
directly import. Industries in which product quality is higher are associated with a decline in productivity 
when input tariffs are reduced. The size of the estimated coefficient is similar for direct importers, but 
it is poorly identified and therefore statistically insignificant. Again, the results for the wholesaling 
interaction term are left unaltered by the inclusion of this additional interaction term.  
The construction of the measure of import wholesaling used within the paper relies only on import 
transactions conducted using ordinary trade rules. This raises a possibility that sectors with more 
wholesaling of imports have by construction less international trade conducted under processing trade 
rules. To explore whether the omission of these processing trade imports can explain our main findings, 
in column 4 we add a control for the share of processing import within total intermediate inputs. Using 
the share of processing imports at the industry level, we convert it at the input level using input-output 
weights as for the other additional industry variable. The main results for wholesaling in column 4 are 
unchanged compared to those in the baseline regressions despite the addition of these new interaction 
terms, although we note that the effect of wholesaling for non-direct importers increases in magnitude 
in this regression. For the processing trade variable, the results indicate that the productivity of non-
direct importers (I+D firms) is higher when there is a higher concentration of processing imported inputs. 
There are no such effects for direct importers (M firms). 
As already discussed above, Arnold et al. (2011) and Arnold et al. (2016) document that the increased 
globalization of the service sector can improve performance within downstream manufacturing sectors 
using those services as inputs. In the next two columns of Table 5 we explore whether wholesalers affect 
firm productivity through channels other than the supply of inputs. In column 5 we explore whether the 
effects of output tariffs also depend on the presence of wholesalers, and in column 6 we explore 
intermediaries also matter for exports. In column 5 we introduce an interaction term between output 
tariffs and a mean centred measure of import wholesaling constructed for the output sector 𝑊𝑆𝑘
𝑦
 (defined 
in the data section above). In column 6 we control for the presence of export wholesalers within the 
industry using the same methodology applied in the construction of the equivalent import version. These 
export transactions must also be completed under ordinary trade rules in the Chinese Customs data. 
The results are suggestive of an effect from wholesalers for both output goods and exports, although 
with opposite signs. In column 5 there is evidence that the positive productivity effects from reductions 
to output tariffs are lower when the presence of intermediaries in the output sector of the firm is greater. 
This suggests that wholesalers contribute to a loss of market share for firms in the domestic market, 
which moves them up their average cost curve, lowering their revenue productivity. In column 6, we 
also find some evidence that the productivity benefits for non-direct importers from reductions to input 
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tariffs are smaller when the wholesaling share of exporting is higher. That is, exporters also appear to 
benefit from the presence of wholesalers. Throughout this, we note that the role import wholesalers play 
in determining the productivity effects from input tariff reductions retains the same sign and statistical 
significance. 
Thus far, we have assumed that the variable WS, the share of import through wholesaling within an 
industry, is fixed at its pre-liberalization value. In column 7 we relax this assumption by using measure 
for WS that we calculate for each year.21 The effect of using the time varying measure of input 
wholesaling in column 7 has little effect on the pattern of results found previously. The results from this 
regression indicate that the intermediation of imported inputs through wholesalers matters for whether 
firms not directly importing gain or lose following input tariff reductions. When wholesalers provide 
firms in the domestic market with access to foreign produced inputs the productivity effects of tariff 
cuts are positive. In contrast they are negative when wholesalers are not present. For direct importers 
we note their productivity is unaffected by the presence of wholesalers but also the insignificance of the 
effect of input tariff cuts for direct importing firms, where this had previously been significant. This 
would appear to be due to a large increase in the standard error in this regression and not to a change in 
the size of the estimated coefficient. This indicates an increase in noise when using the time-varying 
measure of wholesaling such that the effect has become less precisely estimated.  
 
Endogeneity  
In this final section, we consider the possibility that trade policy is endogenous. In our context this 
endogeneity bias is likely to occur because firms within high productivity sectors lobby for lower input 
tariffs, generating a problem of reverse causality. We instrument for changes in output tariffs and 
changes in input tariffs (and their interactions) using 1997 levels of output tariffs, 1997 levels of input 
tariffs (and their interactions) as well as the proportion of workers involved in labor unions (measured 
at the industry level). Instruments based on initial tariffs have been used previously by Amiti and 
Konings (2007) and Goldberg and Pavnick (2005), while Trefler (1993) argues that labor unions can 
lobby for trade protection. The use of tariff levels prior to the start of our sample period (i.e. the period 
of WTO liberalization) follows Goldberg and Pavnick (2005), who show for Colombia that those sectors 
with the largest change in tariffs over the WTO liberalization period corresponded to the sectors with 
highest pre-WTO entry tariff levels since WTO negotiations were aimed to reach a uniform tariff rate 
across sectors.  
                                                          
21 As the wholesaling now varies across time in this regression it is no longer collinear with the firm fixed effects. 
The coefficient on this variable interacted with the not direct importer (I+D) dummy is positive and statistically 
significant with a coefficient (standard error) of 1.261 (0.176). The same variable interacted with the direct import 
dummy has a coefficient (standard error) of -0.214 (0.721) and is therefore insignificantly different from zero at 
conventional levels. 
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Following the argument in Amiti & Konings (2007) that it is easier to find instruments for changes in 
tariffs rather than for levels, we estimate a time differenced model that corresponds to the baseline 
specification in column 2 of Table 4. This allows for the possibility that tariff changes have different 
short- versus longer-run outcomes. We difference the model across one, two, three and four year- periods 
accordingly. The related first-stage regressions are displayed in the Appendix 2. The instruments pass 
the standard test of weak identification in all specifications.22 Moreover, the endogeneity test always 
rejects the null hypothesis that our instrumented variables are exogenous.23  
Qualitatively the results in Table 6 behave similarly to those in previous tables and change little as we 
alter the number of years over which the data are time-differenced. While direct importers’ productivity 
improves as a results of input tariff reductions, these same firms appear unaffected by the extent of 
wholesaling of inputs within the sector. This contrasts with those firms that do not directly import. For 
such firms we continue to find evidence of productivity increases from declines in input tariffs, where 
those gains are largest in sectors where the wholesaling of imports was of greatest importance.  
There are differences compared to the baseline model in Table 4 however. Firstly, in Table 6 we 
consistently find that the effect of input tariff liberalization on the productivity of firms not directly 
importing is positive in an industry with average levels of wholesaling. In Table 4 the effect of input 
tariff reductions at the average level of wholesaling was negative. The value of wholesaling at which 
the input tariff effect turns from negative to positive is correspondingly lower than before, at between 
16-18% depending on the regression.  A second difference compared to the baseline model comes from 
the size of the productivity gains, which are larger than those suggested by the baseline model in Table 
4. For the average reduction in input tariff rates (1.6 percentage points) and at the mean value of import 
wholesaling (0.151), we now estimate that firm productivity increased by between 2.3% (columns 1 and 
4 in Table 6) and 2.4% (columns 2 and 3 in Table 6).  
 
5. Conclusion 
Using Chinese data, this paper provides the first evidence of the role played by wholesaling services in 
determining firm productivity during periods of input trade liberalization in the manufacturing sector. 
Consistent with other studies in the literature, we find that the productivity of both direct importers as 
well as the other firms that do not directly import increases following a decrease in input tariffs, where 
this effect is larger for firms directly involved in importing. While the revenue productivity gains for 
direct importers can be easily connected to their access to more and/or better foreign intermediate inputs, 
as several trade theories predict, understanding the nature of the productivity gains for non-direct 
                                                          
22 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is above the critical values listed in the Table 1 of Stock and Yogo (2005) 
in all specifications (it ranges from 189.2 and 237.7). 
23 The p-value of Endogeneity statistic is 0.000 across all specifications.  
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importing firms has been underexplored. In this paper, we highlight an alternative mechanism: the 
productivity gains of firms not directly engaged in import activities occur because of their indirect access 
to foreign inputs through wholesalers. We document that firms not directly involved in importing enjoy 
productivity gains from input tariff reduction only if intermediation of foreign inputs within their sector 
is high. When wholesalers are not a strong feature of input supply within the industry there are 
productivity losses from input trade liberalization. This is a potentially important effect from trade 
liberalization and suggests policy makers should pay more attention to the role played by trade 
intermediation services.  
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Table 1: Coefficients of the production function 
         
2-digit sector 
 
Labor  Capital  Materials 
 OLS O&P  OLS O&P  OLS O&P 
         
13-14 Processing of foods 0.045 0.042  0.013 0.040  0.916 0.923 
15 Beverages 0.055 0.043  0.018 0.046  0.927 0.941 
17 Textiles 0.055 0.052  0.016 0.029  0.895 0.899 
18 Clothing 0.097 0.096  0.027 0.048  0.843 0.843 
19 Leather/fur/feather 0.064 0.062  0.019 0.032  0.900 0.900 
20 Timber/wood 0.060 0.054  0.011 0.037  0.907 0.927 
21 Furniture 0.064 0.055  0.016 0.030  0.904 0.921 
22 Paper products 0.039 0.036  0.019 0.038  0.914 0.928 
23 Printing 0.051 0.047  0.038 0.039  0.908 0.911 
24 Office equipment 0.077 0.084  0.027 0.039  0.868 0.852 
25 Petroleum/coking 0.070 0.065  0.025 0.034  0.888 0.890 
26 Raw chemical materials 0.045 0.035  0.028 0.048  0.888 0.899 
27 Medicines 0.060 0.054  0.040 0.059  0.880 0.879 
28 Chemical fiber 0.040 0.039  0.013 0.029  0.930 0.929 
29 Rubber 0.075 0.075  0.036 0.023  0.850 0.845 
30 Plastics 0.072 0.066  0.030 0.051  0.871 0.875 
31 Non-metallic minerals 0.083 0.068  0.017 0.005  0.881 0.895 
32 Ferrous metals 0.043 0.037  0.020 0.037  0.921 0.933 
33 Non-ferrous metals 0.057 0.052  0.016 0.030  0.905 0.913 
34 Metal products 0.070 0.068  0.035 0.067  0.856 0.844 
35 General machinery 0.014 0.021  0.025 0.056  0.909 0.912 
36 Special machinery 0.009 0.013  0.018 0.078  0.915 0.922 
37 Transport equipment 0.052 0.051  0.016 0.045  0.902 0.899 
39 Electrical equipment 0.047 0.041  0.025 0.049  0.890 0.906 
40 Electronic equipment 0.081 0.075  0.036 0.073  0.858 0.861 
41 Measuring instruments 0.050 0.041  0.030 0.062  0.862 0.878 
All manufacturing sectors 0.055 0.050  0.023 0.043  0.892 0.898 
Notes: The table refers to estimated elasticities on labor, capital and materials from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function using either OLS or Olley & Pakes (1996) methodology as outlined in Section 3. 
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Table 2: Sample of Chinese manufacturing firms 
     
Year Firm status Percentage 
of firms  
TFP 
(O&P) 
TFP 
 (OLS) 
     
2002 Not Direct importers (I+D) 86.3 0.623 0.829 
Direct Importers (M) 13.7 0.701 0.910 
All firms 100.0 0.634 0.840 
     
     
2006 Not Direct importers (I+D) 85.0 0.802 1.010 
Direct Importers (M) 15.0 0.874 1.083 
All firms 100.0 0.813 1.021 
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Table 3: Indirect imports of final output, indirect imports of intermediate inputs, and inputs 
tariffs by industry 
2-digit sector 
Indirect 
imports of final 
output goods 
 
(𝑊𝑆𝑘
𝑦) 
Indirect 
imports of 
intermediate 
inputs 
(𝑊𝑆𝑘 ) 
 
 
Input tariffs 
𝜏𝑘𝑡 
 2002 2002 2002 2006 
     
     
13-14 Processing of foods 0.500 0.094 0.047 0.036 
15 Beverages 0.370 0.210 0.114 0.090 
17 Textiles 0.394 0.266 0.098 0.057 
18 Clothing 0.588 0.312 0.126 0.076 
19 Leather/fur/feather 0.459 0.303 0.115 0.096 
20 Timber/wood 0.440 0.233 0.054 0.039 
21 Furniture 0.393 0.265 0.071 0.053 
22 Paper products 0.383 0.221 0.069 0.044 
23 Printing 0.435 0.293 0.087 0.055 
24 Office equipment 0.489 0.297 0.089 0.066 
25 Petroleum/coking 0.149 0.042 0.013 0.011 
26 Raw chemical materials 0.361 0.213 0.060 0.051 
27 Medicines 0.349 0.209 0.055 0.045 
28 Chemical fiber 0.609 0.321 0.068 0.048 
29 Rubber 0.369 0.185 0.055 0.046 
30 Plastics 0.313 0.293 0.089 0.070 
31 Non-metallic minerals 0.233 0.157 0.050 0.042 
32 Ferrous metals 0.321 0.138 0.028 0.026 
33 Non-ferrous metals 0.321 0.198 0.027 0.025 
34 Metal products 0.396 0.243 0.057 0.052 
35 General machinery 0.393 0.266 0.068 0.059 
36 Special machinery 0.434 0.278 0.072 0.061 
37 Transport equipment 0.429 0.275 0.098 0.074 
39 Electrical equipment 0.385 0.261 0.076 0.065 
40 Electronic equipment 0.342 0.223 0.060 0.046 
41 Measuring instruments 0.439 0.242 0.070 0.060 
All manufacturing sectors 0.384 0.214 0.068 0.053 
Notes: The variables WSy refers to the share of total imports in each sector that occur through wholesalers. 
WS is a measure of the share of intermediate inputs in each sector that are imported by wholesalers. Further 
details on the construction of these variables can be found in Section 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
Table 4: Trade liberalization and Firm productivity  
Regression No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Amiti and 
Konings 
Baseline 
model 
Including 
Processing 
trade 
importers 
OLS TFP 
Excluding 
exporters 
Ownership 
Dependent variable TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt  TFPjt  
         
Output Tariffkt -0.367*** -0.488*** -0.476*** -0.490*** -0.534***  -0.518***  
 (0.0711) (0.0714) (0.0712) (0.0714) (0.0745)  (0.0715)  
Not Direct Importers (I+D)j      Private 
State 
Owned 
Foreign 
× Input Tariffkt -0.928*** 0.661* 0.617 0.779** 0.566 0.937** 0.429 -0.241 
 (0.307) (0.382) (0.380) (0.382) (0.407) (0.384) (0.569) (0.619) 
× Input Tariffkt × WSk  -18.28*** -18.09*** -18.90*** -19.15*** -19.39*** -26.87*** -4.805 
  (3.390) (3.388) (3.389) (3.674) (3.392) (5.858) (5.327) 
Direct Importers (M) j         
× Input Tariffkt -3.650** -3.035* -3.077* -3.099* -3.085*  -2.879*  
 (1.435) (1.712) (1.705) (1.704) (1.613)  (1.682)  
× Input Tariffkt × WSk  5.048 5.203 6.951 -5.567  3.044  
  (25.83) (25.76) (25.42) (32.27)  (25.85)  
Import Processing Firms j         
× Input Tariffkt   5.877      
   (6.790)      
× Input Tariffkt × WSk   -57.39      
   (71.57)      
Export Status         
Ownership         
Firm Fixed Effects         
Time Dummies         
Observations 40,443 40,443 40,748 40,443 36,673  40,443  
R-squared 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.044 0.038  0.041  
Number of firms 8,247 8,247 8,308 8,247 7,479  8,247  
Notes: Robust standard-errors clustered at the firm-level reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. j 
denotes firms, k industries and t time. Ownership are State Owned, Foreign Owned or Private Domestically Owned firms. WS refers to the 
wholesaling of imported inputs for the year 2002. The estimation sample is balanced panel of firms don't switch sectors and importer status. 
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Table 5: Trade liberalization and Firm productivity: Alternative Channels  
Regression No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Additional Control Variable 
Input import 
competition 
Upstreamness 
 
Input  
quality 
Processing 
imports 
Wholesaling 
of output 
goods 
Export 
Wholesaling 
Time varying  
wholesaling 
Dependent variable TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt 
        
Output Tariffkt -0.490*** -0.477*** -0.493*** -0.512*** -0.493*** -0.384*** -0.445*** 
 (0.0714) (0.0712) (0.0716) (0.0720) (0.0717) (0.0720) (0.0723) 
Output Tariffkt × WSyk     0.931*   
     (0.545)   
Not Direct Importers (I+D)j        
× Input Tariffkt 0.441 0.660* 0.543 0.257 0.662* 0.512 4.794*** 
 (0.447) (0.382) (0.398) (0.380) (0.381) (0.378) (0.632) 
× Input Tariffkt × WSk -17.53*** -21.18*** -18.22*** -70.67*** -19.56*** -8.116** -31.92*** 
 (3.474) (4.470) (3.390) (6.085) (3.453) (3.670) (3.058) 
Direct Importers (M) j        
× Input Tariffkt -3.404* -3.046* -3.225* -3.585** -3.319* -3.030* -3.173 
 (1.837) (1.733) (1.873) (1.684) (1.757) (1.800) (3.168) 
× Input Tariffkt × WSk 6.720 5.444 5.147 28.93 7.771 6.460 -1.713 
 (25.46) (30.76) (26.11) (55.33) (26.02) (24.17) (16.98) 
Additional Controls        
(I+D)j× Input Tariffkt × Additional Control  -2.970 0.403 9.948* 17.28***  -10.37***  
 (3.243) (0.394) (5.154) (1.635)  (1.697)  
(M)j × Input Tariffkt × Additional Control  -14.09 -0.0562 9.205 -6.963  -2.974  
 (24.30) (2.804) (33.68) (17.72)  (9.961)  
Export Status        
Ownership        
Firm Fixed Effects        
Time Dummies        
Observations 40,443 40,443 40,443 40,443 40,443 40,443 40,443 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.046 0.041 0.042 0.045 
Number of firms 8,247 8,247 8,247 8,247 8,247 8,247 8,247 
Notes: Robust standard-errors clustered at the firm-level reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. j denotes firms, k industries and 
t time. Ownership are State Owned, Foreign Owned or Private Domestically Owned firms. WS refers to the wholesaling of imported inputs for the year 2002. The estimation 
sample is balanced panel of firms don't switch sectors and importer status. The additional control variable is listed in the column heading. The construction of these can be found 
in Section 5. 
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Table 6: Trade liberalization and firm productivity: IV regressions  
Regression No. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 One-year  
change 
Two-year 
change 
Three-year 
change 
Fourth-year 
change 
Dependent variable TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt TFPjt 
     
Output Tariff -0.270 -0.376** -0.372** -0.271 
 (0.200) (0.190) (0.188) (0.194) 
Not Direct Importers (I+D)j     
× Input Tariffkt -1.494* -1.426* -1.458* -1.497** 
 (0.764) (0.791) (0.786) (0.752) 
× Input Tariffkt × WSk -24.58*** -33.27*** -32.98*** -24.81*** 
 (5.159) (5.350) (5.312) (5.105) 
Direct Importers (M) j     
× Input Tariffkt -6.742** -6.179** -6.426** -7.095** 
 (2.932) (2.792) (2.799) (2.985) 
× Input Tariffkt × WSk 11.92 4.928 5.843 10.49 
 (37.35) (41.64) (41.74) (39.02) 
     
Export Status     
Ownership     
Firm Fixed Effects     
Time Dummies     
Observations 32,013 23,999 15,924 7,951 
F-statistic for weak identification  216.6 189.2 191.4 237.7 
Endogeneity statistic  59.008 223.441 375.488 490.072 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard-errors clustered at the firm-level reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. j denotes firms, k industries and t time. Ownership are State Owned, Foreign Owned or 
Private Domestically Owned firms. WS refers to the wholesaling of imported inputs for the year 2002. The estimation 
sample is balanced panel of firms don't switch sectors and importer status. The instruments used in these regressions 
include the output tariff in 1997; input tariffs in 1997 interacted with not direct and direct importer status; input tariffs 
in 1997 interacted with the 2002 share of wholesaled inputs (WS) and not direct and direct importer status; and the 
labor union share.  
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Appendix 1: A model of input trade liberalization, wholesaling and TFP. 
This section offers a simple theoretical background to support our empirical analysis, and notably, details 
how trade liberalization in intermediate inputs affects the revenue productivity of firms who import directly, 
versus those firms who do not.  
We consider a model with two identical countries. Within each country, final good producers j produce 
using intermediate inputs i provided either by domestic or by foreign input suppliers. Input suppliers are 
heterogeneous in their productivity and endogenously decide to export or to only sell their output 
domestically. Final good producers, who are also heterogeneous in their productivity, endogenously decide 
their import-mode, that is to import directly from foreign input suppliers (M), to import indirectly through 
wholesalers (I) or to not import at all (D).  
The equations (1), (2) and (3) are identical to the one presented in section 2. We report them below for 
completeness. The two identical countries and populated by L consumers. Consumers have constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences across differentiated final goods. As a result, final good 
producers face the same iso-elastic demand function: 
 𝑦𝑗 = 𝐶(𝑝𝑗 )
−𝜎
,     (1) 
where 𝜎 > 1  is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties 𝑗 and 𝐶 = 𝔼(ℙ)𝜎−1, with 
ℙ the final good price index and 𝔼 denotes total revenue. The wage rate 𝑤 is our numeraire and is 
normalized to one. As a result, total revenue 𝔼 = 𝐿 in the differentiated good sector is also constant.  
Final good producers have an exogenous Hicks-neutral productivity level 𝛩𝑗 and integrate together a set of 
intermediate inputs 𝑥𝑖 into final goods as in Ethier (1982), that in turn are sold to consumers. 
 𝑦𝑗
𝑚 = 𝛩𝑗𝑋
𝑚      with         𝑋𝑚 = (∫(𝑥𝑖
𝐻)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿∫(𝑥𝑖
𝐹_𝑚)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑖)
𝜎
𝜎−1
(2) 
where 𝜎 > 1 is also the elasticity of substitution between intermediate input varieties 𝑖. The subscript 𝐻 
indicates inputs produced at Home, while 𝐹 indicates inputs produced in the foreign country. 𝛿 is a firm 
specific dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the final good producer is either a direct or an indirect 
importer (m=M, I) and the value 0 if the final good producer is not importing any inputs (m=D).  
Given the iso-elastic demand function faced by final producers 𝑗, these firms will set a price as a constant 
mark-up over their marginal cost, which depends on both their Hicks-neutral productivity 𝛩𝑗 and the price 
index of their intermediate inputs 𝑃𝑚, which will take the following form: 
𝑝𝑗
𝑚 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
𝑃𝑚
𝛩𝑗
     with                  𝑃𝑚 = (∫(𝑝𝑖
𝐻)
1−𝜎
𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿∫(𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝑚)
1−𝜎
𝑑𝑖)
1
1−𝜎
(3) 
Final good producers that are direct- or indirect-importers (M and I firms) will be able to consume both 
domestic and foreign varieties, while non-importers (D firms) will only be able to use domestic inputs. 
Demand function for intermediate inputs. 
Final good producers minimize total cost of intermediate inputs, subject to the production technology in (2) 
min
𝑥𝑖
∫𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖  Subject to: 
𝑦𝑗
𝛩𝑗
≥ (∫𝑥𝑖
𝜎−1
𝜎 )
𝜎
𝜎−1
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As a result, the firm-level demand function for intermediate inputs takes the following form: 
𝑥𝑖
𝑚 = (
𝑝𝑖
𝑃𝑚
)
−𝜎 𝑦𝑗
𝛩𝑗
(𝐴1) 
Replacing 𝑦𝑗 using (1) and then adding (3), we obtain a unique demand function for each input variety for 
all type of final good producers (direct-importers, indirect-importers and non-importers):  
𝑥𝑖 = 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝐵(𝑝𝑖)
−𝜎          with     𝐵 =
𝔼
(ℙ)1−𝜎
(
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
)
−𝜎
(𝐴2)  
Summing the demand across all final good producers that are non-importers (D), indirect-importers (I) and 
direct importers (M) in each country and multiplying by the price, we then obtain the total revenue 
generated by a given input i in the domestic market:  
𝑟𝑖
𝐻 = 𝐵𝐴𝐻(𝑝𝑖 )
1−𝜎
with       𝐴𝐻 = ∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝑑𝑗
𝐷
+∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝑑𝑗
𝐼
+∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝑑𝑗
𝑀
(𝐴3) 
The foreign revenue arising from all direct importers is given by 𝑟𝑖
𝐹_𝑀 = 𝐵(𝑝𝑖
𝐹)
1−𝜎
∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝑑𝑗
𝑀
, while the 
foreign revenue of input variety coming from all indirect importers is given by 𝑟𝑖
𝐹_𝐼 =
𝐵(𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝐼)
1−𝜎
∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝑑𝑗
𝐼
. Summing both the foreign demand by direct and indirect importers, we obtain the 
total foreign revenue: 
𝑟𝑖
𝐹 = 𝐵𝐴𝐹(𝑝𝑖
𝐹)
1−𝜎
with       𝐴𝐹 = (𝛾)1−𝜎∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝑑𝑗
𝐼
+∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1𝑑𝑗
𝑀
(𝐴4) 
Where 𝛾 = 𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝐼/𝑝𝑖
𝐹 reflects the relative price difference of exporting goods via wholesalers at price 𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝐼
, 
compared to exporting good directly at price 𝑝𝑖
𝐹. In the model we assume the extra cost 𝛾 associated with 
imports via wholsalers will take the form of an extra iceberg cost. 
 
Production and profit function for intermediate inputs. 
The intermediate input sector is characterized by a continuum of heterogeneous monopolistically 
competitive suppliers. Intermediate input suppliers produce using the following technology: 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝜑𝑖𝑙 (1 + μ(𝜏)) (A5) 
where 𝜑𝑖 is the input supplier 𝑖's idiosyncratic productivity and 𝑙 is the amount of labor hired. Suppliers 
can sell output to final goods producers located in both countries. Suppliers face an iceberg transport cost 
𝜏  when selling abroad. When selling to indirect-importers, an extra iceberg cost 𝛾 will also be included, 
which already have been integrated when defining the total foreign revenue Θ𝐹. Finally, we consider the 
possibility for spillover effects related to trade liberalization, 1 + μ(𝜏), increasing homogeneously the 
productivity level of all suppliers in the intermediate sector when 𝜏 decreases. Given the iso-elastic 
aggregate demand functions, input suppliers set their prices as a constant mark-up over marginal costs: 
𝑝𝑖
𝐻 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
1
𝜑[1 + μ(𝜏)]
     𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝑝𝑖
𝐹 = 𝜏𝑝𝑖
𝐻 , (𝐴6) 
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Domestic and foreign operating profits (before incurring any fixed cost) will be a constant ratio of their 
revenue, so that profits can be written as follows: 
𝜋𝑖
𝑙 =
𝑟𝑖
𝑙
𝜎
− 𝑓𝑙 =
1
𝜎
𝐵A𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑙)
1−𝜎
− 𝑓𝑙 , with    𝑙 = (𝐻, 𝐹) (𝐴7) 
Placing prices into the profit functions and considering both domestic and export zero profit conditions, we 
obtain the following domestic and export productivity cut-offs:  
𝜑𝐻 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
1
[1 + μ(𝜏)]
(
𝜎𝑓𝐻
𝐵𝐴𝐻
)
1
𝜎−1
      𝑎𝑛𝑑       𝜑𝐹 =  𝜑𝐻 𝜏 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
1
1−𝜎
, (𝐴8) 
Assuming 𝑓𝐹 ≥ (𝜏)
1−𝜎(A𝐹/A𝐻)𝑓𝐻 the selection into exporting will be similar to Melitz (2003), where only 
the most productive input suppliers will be able to export, while the least productive may decide not to 
produce. 
 
Intermediate input price indexes: 
We assume that productivity is drawn from a known Pareto cumulative distribution function G(𝜑) = 1 −
 𝜑−𝜅, and probability distribution function g(𝜑) = 𝜅 𝜑−1−𝜅, with 𝑘 > 𝜎 − 1. Using domestic and foreign 
prices 𝑝𝑖
𝐻 and 𝑝𝑖
𝐹 and recalling that 𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝐼 = 𝛾𝑝𝑖
𝐹, using the PDF of the Pareto distribution, solving for the 
integrals and then replacing the entry and export cut-off in the equations (𝜑𝐻 , 𝜑𝐹 ), we obtain: 
𝑃𝐷 = (∫ 𝑝𝑖
𝐻(𝑖)1−𝜎
𝑔(𝜑)𝑑𝜑
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 )
∞
𝜑𝐻
)
1
1−𝜎
 
= (
𝑘
𝜅 − (𝜎 − 1)
)
1
1−𝜎 𝜎
𝜎 − 1
𝑁𝐻
1
1−𝜎[𝜑𝐻[1 + μ(𝜏)]]
−1
(𝐴9) 
𝑃𝑀 = (∫ 𝑝𝑖
𝐻(𝑖)1−𝜎
𝑔(𝜑)𝑑𝜑
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 )
∞
𝜑𝐻
+∫ 𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝑀(𝑖)1−𝜎
𝑔(𝜑)𝑑𝜑
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 )
∞
𝜑𝐹
)
1
1−𝜎
 
= [1 + (𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
]
1
1−𝜎
𝑃𝐷 (𝐴10) 
𝑃𝐼 = (∫ 𝑝𝑖
𝐻(𝑖)1−𝜎
𝑔(𝜑)𝑑𝜑
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 )
∞
𝜑𝐻
+∫ 𝑝𝑖
𝐹_𝐼(𝑖)1−𝜎
𝑔(𝜑)𝑑𝜑
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 )
∞
𝜑𝐹
)
1
1−𝜎
 
= [1 + (𝛾)1−𝜎(𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
]
1
1−𝜎
𝑃𝐷 (𝐴11) 
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Free entry condition and Number of input varieties. 
Solving the inputs’ price index of non-importers 𝑃𝐷 requires both the entry cut-off 𝜑𝐻 and the number of 
active firms 𝑁𝐻. As in Melitz (2003), suppliers have to pay a sunk cost of entry 𝑓𝑒 in order to discover their 
idiosyncratic productivity level 𝜑. Suppliers then decide whether to exit the market, or stay and produce 
only for the domestic market or for both the domestic and export markets. 
?̃? = ∫𝜋(𝜑)𝑑𝐺(𝜑) =
𝑓𝑒
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 ) 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→    𝜑𝐻 = [
?̃?
𝑓𝑒 
]
1
𝑘
= [
?̃? − 𝜎𝑓
𝜎𝑓𝑒 
]
1
𝑘
(𝐴12) 
We obtain the average revenue ?̅? of active suppliers by using the expression for 𝑟𝑖
𝐻 and 𝑟𝑖
𝐹 and the PDF of 
the Pareto distribution, solving for the integrals and then replacing the entry and export cut-off in the 
equations (𝜑𝐻 , 𝜑𝐹 ), we obtain the following expression: 
?̃? = ∫ 𝑟𝐷
𝑔(𝜑)𝑑𝜑
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 )
+
∞
𝜑𝐻
∫ 𝑟𝐹
𝑔(𝜑)𝑑𝜑
1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐻 )
∞
𝜑𝐹
 
=
𝜎𝜅
𝜅 − (𝜎 − 1)
𝑓𝐻 {1 + (𝜏)
−𝑘
𝐴𝐹
𝐴𝐻
(
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
} (𝐴13) 
All active suppliers pay the fixed cost of producing 𝑓𝐻 while only a fraction [1 − 𝐺(𝜑𝐹 ) ]/[1 −
𝐺(𝜑𝐻 ) ] = (𝜑𝐹 /𝜑𝐻 )
−𝜅 are exporting and pay an additional fixed cost 𝑓𝐹, such that the average fixed-cost 
𝑓 ̅of active suppliers is given by: 
𝑓 = 𝑓𝐻 {1 + (𝜏)
−𝑘
𝐴𝐹
𝐴𝐻
(
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
} (𝐴14) 
The mass of suppliers producing for the domestic market 𝑁𝐻 id obtained by dividing the aggregate revenue 
in the intermediate input sector 𝑅 by the average revenue ?̅? of active suppliers: 𝑁𝐻 = 𝑅/ ?̃?.  
𝑁𝐻 =
𝑅
𝜎𝜅
𝜅 − (𝜎 − 1)
𝑓𝐻 {1 + (𝜏)−𝑘
𝐴𝐹
𝐴𝐻
(
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
}
(𝐴15)
 
By replacing ?̃? and 𝑓, taken from equations (A13) and (A14) respectively, into equation (A12), we obtain 
the entry cut-off 𝜑𝐻.  
𝜑𝐻 = [
1
𝜎𝑓𝑒 
]
1
𝑘
[
𝜎(𝜎 − 1)
𝜅 − (𝜎 − 1)
𝑓𝐻 {1 + (𝜏)
−𝑘
𝐴𝐹
𝐴𝐻
(
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
}]
1
𝑘
(𝐴16) 
Replacing the entry cut-off 𝜑𝐻 and the number of active firms 𝑁𝐻 in (A9), we obtain the following 
expression for 𝑃𝐷: 
𝑃𝐷 ∝ (1 +
A𝐹
A𝐻
(𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
)
𝑘−(𝜎−1)
𝑘(𝜎−1)
[[1 + μ(𝜏)]]
−1
(𝐴17) 
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Endogenous import decision of final-good producers 
The operating profit (before incurring any fixed cost) will be a constant ratio of their revenue, so that the 
domestic profit can be written as follows: 
𝜋𝑗
𝑚 =
1
𝜎
(𝑝𝑗
𝑚)
1−𝜎
𝔼(ℙ)𝜎−1 − 𝑓𝑚 (𝐴18) 
Assume 𝑓𝑀 > 𝑓𝐼 > 𝑓𝐷. Zero-profit condition of non-importers is given by  𝜋𝑗
𝐷(𝛩𝐷) = 0. Indirect-import 
cutoff is given by  𝜋𝑗
𝐼(𝛩𝐼 ) − 𝜋𝑗
𝐷(𝛩𝐼 ) = 0, while direct-import cutoff is  𝜋𝑗
𝑀(𝛩𝑀) − 𝜋𝑗
𝐼(𝛩𝑀) = 0.  
𝛩𝐷 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
(
1
𝜎𝑓𝐷
𝔼)
1
1−𝜎 𝑃𝐷
ℙ
(𝐴19) 
𝛩𝐼 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
(
1
𝜎
𝔼)
1
1−𝜎 1
ℙ
[
(𝑃𝐼)1−𝜎 − (𝑃𝐷)1−𝜎
𝑓𝐼 − 𝑓𝐷
]
1
1−𝜎
 
=  𝛩𝐷 [
𝑓𝐷
𝑓𝐼 − 𝑓𝐷
(𝛾)1−𝜎(𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
]
1
1−𝜎
(𝐴20) 
𝛩𝑀 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
(
1
𝜎
𝔼)
1
1−𝜎 1
ℙ
[
(𝑃𝑀)1−𝜎 − (𝑃𝐼)1−𝜎
𝑓𝑀 − 𝑓𝐼
]
1
1−𝜎
 
=  𝛩𝐷 [
𝑓𝐷
𝑓𝑀 − 𝑓𝐼
[1 − (𝛾)1−𝜎](𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
]
1
1−𝜎
(𝐴21) 
We assume that final-good producers also draw their productivity from a known Pareto cumulative 
distribution function H(𝛩) = 1 − 𝛩−𝑣, and probability distribution function h(𝛩) = 𝑣 𝛩−1−𝑣, with 𝑣 >
𝜎 − 1. With this assumption in hand, we can calculate the share of final-good producers  𝜒𝑚 with 𝑚 =
(𝐷, 𝐼,𝑀), that are non-importers (D), indirect-importers (I) or direct-importers (M) among all active final-
good producers:  
𝜒𝐼 = (
 𝛩𝐼
 𝛩𝐷
)
−𝑣
− (
 𝛩𝑀
 𝛩𝐷
)
−𝑣
= [(𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
]
𝑣
𝜎−1
([
𝑓𝐷
𝑓𝐼 − 𝑓𝐷
(𝛾)1−𝜎]
𝑣
𝜎−1
− [
𝑓𝐷
𝑓𝑀 − 𝑓𝐼
[1 − (𝛾)1−𝜎]]
𝑣
𝜎−1
) (𝐴22) 
𝜒𝐷 = 1 − (
 𝛩𝐼
 𝛩𝐷
)
−𝑣
= 1 − [
𝑓𝐷
𝑓𝐼− 𝑓𝐷
(𝛾)1−𝜎(𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝜎−𝜅−1
1−𝜎
]
𝑣
𝜎−1
(𝐴23) 
The share of firms importing directly will simply be 𝜒𝑀 = 1 − (𝜒𝐼 + 𝜒𝐷). 
Using (A3) and (A4) we can also rewrite 𝐴𝐻 and 𝐴𝐹 across all K final-good producers as follow: 
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𝐴𝐻 = 𝐾 [ ∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1
 𝛩𝐼
 𝛩𝐷
ℎ(𝜃)
1 − 𝐻( 𝛩𝐷)
+ ∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1
 𝛩𝑀
 𝛩𝐼
ℎ(𝜃)
1 − 𝐻( 𝛩𝐷)
+ ∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1
∞
 𝛩𝑀
ℎ(𝜃)
1 − 𝐻( 𝛩𝐷)
] 
𝐴𝐹 = 𝐾 [(𝛾)1−𝜎 ∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1
 𝛩𝑀
 𝛩𝐼
ℎ(𝜃)
1 − 𝐻( 𝛩𝐷)
+ ∫ 𝛩𝑗
𝜎−1
∞
 𝛩𝑀
ℎ(𝜃)
1 − 𝐻( 𝛩𝐷)
] 
Solving for the ratio A𝐹/A𝐻, we obtain: 
𝐴𝐹
𝐴𝐻
= [(𝛾)1−𝜎 [
𝑓𝐷(𝛾)
1−𝜎
𝑓𝐼 − 𝑓𝐷
]
𝑣−(𝜎−1)
𝜎−1
+ (1 − (𝛾)1−𝜎) [
𝑓𝐷[1 − (𝛾)
1−𝜎]
𝑓𝑀 − 𝑓𝐼
]
𝑣−(𝜎−1)
𝜎−1
]
(𝜎−1)(𝜎−1)
𝛿
 
× [
𝑓𝐻
𝑓𝐹
]
(𝑣−(𝜎−1))(𝑘−(𝜎−1))
𝛿
(𝜏)−𝑘
(𝜎−1)(𝑣−(𝜎−1))
𝛿 (𝐴24) 
where we assume 𝛿 = 𝑣(𝜎 − 1) + 𝑘(𝜎 − 1) − 𝑘𝑣 > 0. This condition is required to ensure that the ratio 
𝐴𝐹/𝐴𝐻 is indeed less than one - which should be the case by definition. In this case, a decrease of the input 
trade cost 𝜏 or of the fixed cost of exporting 𝑓𝐹 leads to a reallocation effect where export revenue increases 
compared to domestic revenue. 
Empirical implications of the model 
The effect of input trade liberalization is expected to be different depending on the prevalence of firms 
importing through wholesalers among the group of firms that are not directly importing (I + D firms). 
First, we abstract from potential positive spillover effects related to trade liberalization, 1 + μ(𝜏). Recall 
that the inputs’ price index of non- importers (D firms) given by equation (𝐴17) is: 
𝑃𝐷 ∝ (1 +
𝐴𝐹
𝐴𝐻
(𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝑘−(𝜎−1)
𝜎−1
 )
𝑘−(𝜎−1)
𝑘(𝜎−1)
[[1 + μ(𝜏)]]−1 
Holding A𝐻 and 𝐴𝐹 constant, it follows directly from this expression that as the input trade cost 𝜏  decreases, 
the price index of intermediate inputs faced by non-importers, 𝑃𝐷, increases. It also follows directly that a 
decrease in 𝜏 implies an increase in the ratio 𝐴𝐹/𝐴𝐻, reinforcing this increase.  
As a result, in an industry where the cost associated with intermediaries is high enough such that no firms 
choose to import using wholesalers, then 𝑃𝐼+𝐷 = 𝑃𝐷. As 𝑃𝐷 is increasing with input trade liberalization, a 
negative effect on firms’ revenue-based TFP is expected from input trade liberalization in an industry where 
the costs of intermediation are high.  
Considering industries with lower cost of intermediation, this negative effect will be mitigated by the 
increase in the share of firms able to import through intermediaries. In fact, trade liberalization in 
intermediate inputs decreases 𝑃𝐼/𝑃𝐷. To see this, using equation (A11), recall that: 
𝑃𝐼
𝑃𝐷
= [1 + (𝛾)1−𝜎(𝜏)−𝑘 (
𝐴𝐹𝑓𝐻
𝐴𝐻𝑓𝐹
)
𝑘−(𝜎−1)
𝜎−1
]
1
1−𝜎
 
  
40 
 
As a result, the relative benefit of trade liberalization on the revenue-based TFP of non-direct importers (I 
+ D firms) will be higher in an industry where the share of firms importing indirectly is high compared to 
the share of firms not importing at all. 
 
Second, a difficulty when evaluating the impact of input trade liberalization on the group of firms not 
importing directly in a given sector (I + D firms) is that we do not observe the share of firms importing 
indirectly in the data. In addition, the cost associated with intermediaries within an industry is also not 
observable empirically. However, we can show that there is an inverse relationship between the Wholesaler 
Share (WS) variable, i.e. the share of final-good producers importing via wholesalers among all importers, 
and the cost associated with intermediaries within an industry, 𝛾.  
𝑊𝑆 =
 𝜒𝐼
(𝜒𝑀 +  𝜒𝐼)
= 1 − (
 𝛩𝑀
 𝛩𝐼
)
−𝑣
= 1 − [
𝑓𝐼 − 𝑓𝐷
𝑓𝑀 − 𝑓𝐼
[1 − (𝛾)1−𝜎]
(𝛾)1−𝜎
]
𝑣
𝜎−1
 
where WS is decreasing in 𝛾. The Wholesaler Share (WS) variable can also be expressed as the share of 
the import expenditure via wholesalers in total import of intermediate inputs purchased within the final 
good sector. 
𝑊𝑆_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
𝑟𝑖
𝐹_𝐼
𝑟𝑖
𝐹_𝑀 + 𝑟𝑖
𝐹_𝐼 = 1 − [(
𝑓𝐼 − 𝑓𝐷
𝑓𝑀 − 𝑓𝐼
[1 − (𝛾)1−𝜎]
[(𝛾)1−𝜎]
)
−
𝑣−(𝜎−1)
𝜎−1
𝛾1−𝜎 + (1 − (𝛾)1−𝜎)]
−1
 
where it can be shown increasing the cost associated with intermediaries, 𝛾, decrease the import expenditure 
via wholesalers within an industry, that is 𝜕WS_value/𝜕𝛾 < 0. This theoretical result is key for the 
interpretation of our empirical results. Input trade liberalization is expected to decrease TFP in an industry 
with high input wholesaling cost, that is where WS is low, while this negative productivity loss will be 
mitigated in an industry with low input wholesaling cost, that is where WS is high. 
Critically, both measures for WS are independent of the iceberg transport cost 𝜏 and so are unaffected by 
trade liberalization in the intermediate input sector. For this reason, we will consider WS in our empirical 
specification as an industry characteristics invariant over time. 
 
Third, let us consider the possibility for a spillover effect related to trade liberalization, increasing the 
productivity level of all suppliers in the intermediate sector by 1 + μ(𝜏) as in equation (A6). As a result, 
the intermediate input price indices reported in equations (A9)-(A11) for all final good producers decreases 
and the revenue-based TFP of all final-good producers increase homogeneously.  
In an industry with high intermediaries cost such that no firm choose to import using wholesalers, a positive 
spillover effect could potentially counter-balance the negative effect of input trade liberalization described 
above. In this case, 𝑃𝐷 may decrease with input trade liberalization and all firms experience an increase of 
their revenue-based TFP.  
Nevertheless, a homogeneous positive spillover would not affect the relative gains from input trade 
liberalization experienced by firms importing using wholesalers. In fact, 𝑃𝐼/𝑃𝐷 is not affected by the 
spillover effect. In this case, the positive spillover effects associated with input liberalization will increase 
firms’ revenue-based TFP but would not affect the magnitude of the range of effects when comparing 
industry where WS is high with an industry where WS is low. In other words, any spillover effects will 
affect the average change in TFP (in a hypothetical industry with an average level of WS), but not the 
coefficient associated with interaction between tariff changes and WS that is of interest to us. 
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Appendix 2: Instrumental variable approach: First-stage regressions 
 
 
Table A1: First stage in IV estimation (One-period difference) 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Variables    Non-Importers  Direct Importers 
  ΔOutput Tariff  ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002)  ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002) 
         
Output Tariff1997  -0.0573***  -0.0019*** -4.23e-05***  -3.35e-05*** 2.00e-07 
  (0.0014)  (0.0002) (1.35e-05)  (1.25e-05) (7.85e-07) 
Not Direct Importers (I+D)j         
× Input Tariff1997  -0.0526***  -0.0692*** -0.0009***  -0.0002*** -6.72e-06* 
  (0.00545)  (0.0008) (4.47e-05)  (5.83e-05) (3.97e-06) 
× Input Tariff1997 × WS  0.131***  -0.0061 -0.0463***  0.0006*** 2.20e-05 
  (0.0334)  (0.0041) (0.0004)  (0.0002) (1.46e-05) 
Direct Importers (M)j         
× Input Tariff1997  -0.0542***  -0.0337*** -0.0009***  -0.0371*** 1.54e-05 
  (0.0115)  (0.0014) (6.27e-05)  (0.0023) (0.0001) 
× Input Tariff1997 × WS  0.132  0.141*** 0.0037***  -0.113** -0.0492*** 
  (0.166)  (0.0224) (0.0008)  (0.0507) (0.0058) 
         
Labor union share  6.25e-06***  2.74e-06*** 2.79e-07***  3.08e-09 2.04e-09** 
  (7.25e-07)  (8.49e-08) (6.34e-09)  (1.52e-08) (8.41e-10) 
         
Δ Export Status         
Δ Ownership         
Time dummies         
         
Observations  32,013  32,013 32,013  32,013 32,013 
Notes: The dependent variable is firm’s total factor productivity estimated by Olley-Pakes (2003)’s methodology. WS refers to the wholesaling of imported inputs for the year 
2002. Ownership are State Owned, Foreign Owned or Private Domestically Owned firms. Robust standard-errors clustered at the firm-level reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table A2: First stage in IV estimation (Two-period difference) 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Variables    Non- Importers  Direct Importers 
  ΔOutput Tariff  ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002)  ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002) 
         
Output Tariff1997  -0.119***  -0.0045*** -0.0002***  -7.46e-05*** -3.90e-08 
  (0.0032)  (0.0004) (2.87e-05)  (2.71e-05) (1.67e-06) 
Not Direct Importers (I+D)j         
× Input Tariff1997  -0.119***  -0.143*** -0.0020***  -0.0004*** -1.51e-05* 
  (0.0120)  (0.0017) (9.87e-05)  (0.000124) (8.45e-06) 
× Input Tariff1997 × WS  0.287***  -0.0459*** -0.0971***  0.0013*** 4.80e-05 
  (0.0745)  (0.0089) (0.000877)  (0.0005) (3.07e-05) 
Direct Importers (M)j         
× Input Tariff1997  -0.133***  -0.0717*** -0.0020***  -0.0748*** 1.14e-05 
  (0.0221)  (0.0029) (0.0001)  (0.0050) (0.0002) 
× Input Tariff1997 ×WS  0.485*  0.305*** 0.0088***  -0.270** -0.103*** 
  (0.277)  (0.0464) (0.0019)  (0.114) (0.0136) 
         
Labor union share  1.58e-05***  6.89e-06*** 6.31e-07***  1.36e-08 4.49e-09** 
  (1.50e-06)  (1.86e-07) (1.46e-08)  (3.25e-08) (1.91e-09) 
         
Δ Export Status         
Δ Ownership         
Time dummies         
         
Observations  23,999  23,999 23,999  23,999 23,999 
Notes: The dependent variable is firm’s total factor productivity estimated by Olley-Pakes (2003)’s methodology. WS refers to the wholesaling of imported inputs for the 
year 2002. Ownership are State Owned, Foreign Owned or Private Domestically Owned firms. Robust standard-errors clustered at the firm-level reported in parentheses. 
***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table A3: First stage in IV estimation (Three-period difference) 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Variables    Non- Importers  Direct Importers 
  ΔOutput Tariff  ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002)  ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002) 
         
Output Tariff1997  -0.182***  -0.0071*** -0.0002***  -0.0001*** -5.86e-07 
  (0.0047)  (0.0007) (4.31e-05)  (3.90e-05) (2.36e-06) 
Not Direct Importers (I+D)j         
× Input Tariff1997  -0.176***  -0.215*** -0.0029***  -0.0005*** -2.11e-05* 
  (0.0181)  (0.00251) (0.000148)  (0.0002) (1.24e-05) 
× Input Tariff1997 × WS  0.424***  -0.0660*** -0.146***  0.0018*** 7.00e-05 
  (0.112)  (0.0134) (0.00131)  (0.000677) (4.52e-05) 
Direct Importers (M)j         
× Input Tariff1997  -0.196***  -0.108*** -0.0030***  -0.113*** 2.54e-06 
  (0.0332)  (0.0043) (0.0002)  (0.0074) (0.0004) 
× Input Tariff1997 ×WS  0.743*  0.460*** 0.0131***  -0.407** -0.155*** 
  (0.416)  (0.0690) (0.00276)  (0.169) (0.0203) 
         
Labor union share  2.36e-05***  1.03e-05*** 9.52e-07***  1.78e-08 6.49e-09** 
  (2.26e-06)  (2.78e-07) (2.20e-08)  (4.80e-08) (2.77e-09) 
         
Δ Export Status         
Δ Ownership         
Time dummies         
         
Observations  15,924  15,924 15,924  15,924 15,924 
Notes: The dependent variable is firm’s total factor productivity estimated by Olley-Pakes (2003)’s methodology. WS refers to the wholesaling of imported inputs for the 
year 2002. Ownership are State Owned, Foreign Owned or Private Domestically Owned firms. Robust standard-errors clustered at the firm-level reported in parentheses. 
***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table A4: First stage in IV estimation (Four-period difference) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables   Non- Importers Direct Importers 
  ΔOutput Tariff ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002) ΔInput Tariff Δ(Input Tariff × WS2002) 
       
Output Tariff1997  -0.237*** -0.0079*** -0.0001** -0.0002*** -1.69e-07 
  (0.0055) (0.0009) (5.40e-05) (5.02e-05) (3.05e-06) 
Not Direct Importers (I+D)j       
× Input Tariff1997  -0.196*** -0.278*** -0.0034*** -0.0006*** -2.34e-05 
  (0.0221) (0.0031) (0.0002) (0.0002) (1.57e-05) 
× Input Tariff1997 × WS  0.452*** -0.0219 -0.186*** 0.0021** 7.51e-05 
  (0.135) (0.0163) (0.0016) (0.0009) (5.74e-05) 
Direct Importers (M)j       
× Input Tariff1997  -0.220*** -0.135*** -0.0034*** -0.149*** 2.13e-05 
  (0.0434) (0.0054) (0.0002) (0.0093) (0.0004) 
× Input Tariff1997 ×WS  0.816 0.579*** 0.0150*** -0.469** -0.199*** 
  (0.591) (0.0863) (0.0032) (0.200) (0.0232) 
       
Labor union share  2.59e-05*** 1.12e-05*** 1.11e-06*** -4.23e-09 6.68e-09** 
  (2.95e-06) (3.40e-07) (2.54e-08) (5.78e-08) (3.00e-09) 
       
Δ Export Status       
Δ Ownership       
       
Observations  7,951  7,951 7,951  
Notes: The dependent variable is firm’s total factor productivity estimated by Olley-Pakes (2003)’s methodology. WS refers to the wholesaling of imported inputs for the year 
2002. Ownership are State Owned, Foreign Owned or Private Domestically Owned firms. Robust standard-errors clustered at the firm-level reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
*, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
